F-35: Hightech Kampfjet oder 1,5 Billionen US$ Desaster?

von Roger Näbig (TwitterFacebook). Er arbeitet als Jurist und freier Journalist in Berlin mit dem Fokus auf globalen Konflikten, Verteidigung, Sicherheit, Militärpolitik, Rüstungstechnik & Kriegsvölkerrecht. Darüber hinaus hält er Vorträge zu verteidigungspolitischen Themen.

F-35A off the coast of Northwest Florida (photo: U.S. Air Force by Master Sgt. Donald R. Allen [Public domain]).

F-35A off the coast of Northwest Florida (photo: U.S. Air Force by Master Sgt. Donald R. Allen [Public domain]).

Es ist das teuerste Beschaffungsprogramm für Kampfflugzeuge in der Militärgeschichte: F-35 Lightning II, so der offizielle Name, ist das von der Firma Lockheed Martin für die US Air Force (USAF), US Navy (USN) und das US Marine Corps (USMC), im Zuge des Joint Strike Fighter Programms, gemeinsam entwickelte Tarnkappen-Mehrzweckkampfflugzeug der 5. Generation, das die F-16 Falcon, F-18 Hornet, AV-8B Harrier II und A-10 Warthog in den US Luftstreitkräften ablösen soll. Während die ‘A’ Version der USAF konventionell startet und landet (CTOL: Conventional Take-Off and Landing), handelt es sich bei der ‘B’ um eine für das USMC und deren amphibische Angriffsschiffe eigens entwickelte, kurzstartende und vertikal landende Variante (STOVL: Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing) während die ‘C’ Version von Flugzeugträgern der USN aus eingesetzt wird (CV: Carrier Variant). Bis zum Jahr 2070 wird die Beschaffung, der Betrieb und die Wartung der rund 2.400 Kampfflugzeuge Kosten in Höhe von ca. 1,5 Billionen US$ verschlingen.

Die F-35 soll zum Exportschlager werden
Im Gegensatz zum Stealth-Luftüberlegenheitsjäger F-22 Raptor war und ist die F-35 von Anfang an für den Export vorgesehen gewesen. Acht weitere Länder kaufen nicht nur die F-35, sondern beteiligen sich zudem aktiv an der Gesamtfinanzierung des Projekts sowie am Bau des Kampfflugzeuges: Großbritannien, Italien, Australien, Kanada, Norwegen, Dänemark, Niederlande und die Türkei. Israel verfügt bei dem Projekt über eine Sonderstellung, weil es die F-35 als einziges Land mit eigener Avionik und Software ausrüsten darf und die Wartung selbst übernimmt. Japan und Korea schließlich sind reine Käuferländer. Trotz dieser internationalen Kooperation ist das Projekt sieben Jahre im Verzug und bislang mit $163 Mrd. über dem ürsprünglich veranschlagten Budget. Jeder Kampfjet der Version ‘A’ kostet aktuell ca. $95 Mio., die ‘B’ und ‘C’ sogar rund $120 Mio. Während bei Beginn der Entwicklungsphase die Planer noch eine 80%ige Übereinstimmung der Bauteile für die ‘A’, ‘B und ‘C’ Varianten zur Reduzierung der Wartungskosten vorgesehen hatten, verblieben davon schließlich versionsabhängig nur noch 27 bis 43%. Gründe dafür waren u.a. die Wünsche des USMC nach einer STOVL-Fähigkeit, um auch die veralteten, senkrechtstartenden AV-8B Kampfjets zu ersetzen, sowie der USN nach größeren, anklappbaren Tragflächen mit mehr Treibstoffzuladung und einem verstärkten Fahrwerk für den Einsatz auf Flugzeugträgern. Die USAF war da anfangs etwas genügsamer: Sie wollte zunächst lediglich ihre F-16 und A-10 ersetzen, wobei da noch die Beschaffung einer größeren Zahl von F-22 geplant war, die sich dann später aus Kostengründen nicht realisieren ließ. Die hierdurch entstandene Lücke bei Luftüberlegenheitsjägern soll die F-35 für die USAF nun auch noch schließen.

U.S. Government [Public domain]

U.S. Government [Public domain]


Die deutsche Luftwaffe wünscht sich die F-35 als Ersatz für Tornado
Ende letzten Jahres plädierte der ehemalige Inspekteur der Luftwaffe Karl Müllner indirekt für die F-35 als Ersatz für die überalterten 85 deutschen Tornado Mehrzweckkampfflugzeuge. Die Luftwaffe benötige nach den Worten Müllners ein Kampfflugzeug, das bei geringer Radarsignatur feindliche Ziele aus großer Entfernung bekämpfen könne. Für eine gänzliche Neuentwicklung sei es schon zu spät. Das Verteidigungsministerium erklärte im Gegensatz hierzu, einen weiterentwickelten Eurofighter Typhoon als Ersatz für die Tornado zu präferieren und prüft wohl nur nachrangig auch die Beschaffung der F-35, F-15 oder F/A-18 (“‘F-35’ für die Bundeswehr?: Luftwaffe benennt Anforderungen an ‘Tornado’-Nachfolger“, Spiegel Online, 08.11.2017). General Müllner wurde am 29.5.2018 vorzeitig in den Ruhestand geschickt. Politisch und militärisch heikel ist die Beschaffung schon deshalb, weil die deutschen Tornados u.a. für die sogenannte “nukleare Teilhabe” vorgesehen sind. Während die US Kampfflugzeuge allesamt eine Freigabe zum Abwurf der entsprechenden B-61 Atombomben besitzen (F-15, F-18) oder bald besitzen werden (F-35 vermutlich ab 2020), müsste der Eurofighter, abgesehen von den noch zu schaffenden technischen Voraussetzungen, eine entsprechende Freigabe von der US-Regierung überhaupt erst einmal bekommen. Dafür würden die USA Einblick in die technischen Spezifikationen und Unterlagen des Eurofighters verlangen, was den europäischen Partnern des Projektes allein schon aus Wettbewerbsgründen kaum recht sein dürfte.

Eurofighter Typhoon EF2000 (reg. 30+68) of the German Air Force (Deutsche Luftwaffe, Taktisches Luftwaffengeschwader 74) at ILA Berlin Air Show 2016 (photo: Julian Herzog [GFDL or CC BY 4.0].

Eurofighter Typhoon EF2000 (reg. 30+68) of the German Air Force (Deutsche Luftwaffe, Taktisches Luftwaffengeschwader 74) at ILA Berlin Air Show 2016 (photo: Julian Herzog [GFDL or CC BY 4.0].


Ist die F-35 das richtige Flugzeug für die deutsche Luftwaffe?
Aber wäre die F-35A, die von Fachleuten auch gern etwas spöttisch als “fliegender Computer” bezeichnet wird, wirklich ein geeigneter Nachfolger für die Tornado der Bundesluftwaffe? Sollte das Verteidigungsministerium nicht eher auf einen für die “nukleare Teilhabe” modifizierten Eurofighter setzen oder besser noch die erprobte F-18 Super Hornet anschaffen? Natürlich melden sich bei einem Rüstungsprojekt dieser Größenordnung sofort die Kritiker zu Wort. Bei der F-35 entzünden sich die Meinungen vor allem an dem Versuch des Herstellers Lockheed Martin, nicht nur ein Kampfflugzeug für drei unterschiedliche Teilstreitkräfte und deren spezifische Anforderungen zu entwickeln, sondern gleich noch eine Vielzahl älterer Flugzeugtypen für die Aufgaben Luftüberlegenheit (F-15), Mehrzweck (F-16), Luftnahunterstützung (A-10), als Senkrechtstarter (AV-8B) sowie Bomber und Elektronische Kampfführung (F/A-18) zu ersetzen. Ein Projekt, das wegen seiner Komplexität von Anfang an zum Scheitern verurteilt sein musste, nun aber zu groß und zu teuer geworden ist, um es wirklich noch scheitern zu lassen? Ungewöhnlich ist es, dass dem Hersteller Lockheed Martin bei der Auftragserteilung zugestanden wurde, schon in der Test- und Erprobungsphase eine Vielzahl von “Vorserienmodellen” zu produzieren (sog. “Concurrency“) und diese an die US Streitkräfte auszuliefern (Stand Juli 2018: 305+ Stück), anstatt die Produktion erst nach der Serienreife einer kleineren Anzahl von Prototypen aufzunehmen (“fly before you buy”).

Bericht der internen Revision des Pentagon zur F-35 ist ernüchternd
Der Director Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E – interne Revisionsbehörde) im US Verteidigungsministerium überwacht bei Beschaffungsmaßnahmen der US Army die Einhaltung der vertraglich festgelegten technischen und sicherheitsrelevanten Anforderungen für Waffensysteme aller Art. Dessen Berichte und Beurteilungen über den Fortgang und den aktuellen Status des F-35 Projektes durch die Entwicklungsabteilung Joint Program Office (JPO) für die Fiskaljahre 2016 und 2017 sind – zurückhaltend ausgedrückt – sehr ernüchternd: im aktuellen Prüfbericht 2017 stellt der DOT&E fest, dass die operative Eignung der F-35 hinter den Anforderungen zurückbleibe und die Erwartungen der Streitkräfte bisher nicht erfülle. Einsätze könnten teilweise nur durch technisch nicht vorgesehene Problemumgehungen geflogen werden. Das Beschaffungsprogramm liefere zur Zeit F-35 mit fehlenden Fähigkeiten aus, die im Kampf gegen aktuelle Bedrohungen eigentlich benötigt werden. Die landesweite Verfügbarkeitsrate der F-35 Flotte verharre seit Oktober 2014 bei inakzeptablen 50%, obwohl seitdem immer mehr Maschinen in Dienst gestellt wurden. Auch die technische Zuverlässigkeit der ausgelieferten Flugzeuge stagniere, so dass eine akzeptable Schwelle für die durchschnittliche Flugzeit bis zum Auftreten eines kritischen Fehlers eigentlich nur noch durch die gänzliche Neuentwicklung fehlerhafter Flugzeugkomponenten in der Zukunft erreichbar sei.

JSF maintainer (photo: Chrissy Cuttita / U.S. Air Force [Public domain])

JSF maintainer (photo: Chrissy Cuttita / U.S. Air Force [Public domain])

Der DOT&E hat in seinem Bericht insgesamt 301 schwerwiegende (Software-)Fehler u.a. in den Bereichen Zielbekämpfung, Waffenintegration, Überlebensfähigkeit, Missionsplanung, Cyber-Sicherheit, ALIS-Software und Wartungsfähigkeit festgestellt. Davon sind zumindestens 88 in der “Bearbeitung”, die restlichen 213 Fehler bleiben erst einmal ungelöst. Diese schwerwiegenden Mängel lassen die für den Beginn der Serienfertigung der F-35 notwendige Bestätigung der bedingten bzw. grundsätzlichen Einsatzbereitschaft durch den DOT&E nicht zu. Um dennoch den Bau weiterer, nicht vollständig einsatzreifer F-35 fortsetzen zu können, möchte die JPO nun dennoch die Entwicklungsphase offiziell abschließen und in eine “kontinuierliche Fähigkeitsfortentwicklungs- und Lieferphase” übergehen. An dieser Vorgehensweise meldet die interne Revision in ihrem 2017er Bericht aber ernsthafte Bedenken an. Wohl auch deswegen, weil durch gleichzeitige Entwicklung, Prototypentests und Vorserienproduktion eine beträchtliche Anzahl von F-35 mit unterschiedlichen Ausstattungen existieren. Die bereits erwähnte Einsatzprüfung zur Aufnahme der Serienproduktion wird wohl erst Ende 2019 möglich sein. Bis dahin sind dann aber bereits mehr als 600 Flugzeuge gebaut und ausgeliefert worden. Diese müssen später allesamt nachgerüstet werden, was wiederum erhebliche Kosten auslösen wird. Die USAF hatte deswegen bereits ernsthaft in Erwägung gezogen, 108 ausgelieferte, voll bezahlte F-35A Vorserienmodelle erst gar nicht mehr zu aktualisieren (sog. “Concurrency Orphans”), was nun jedoch wieder verworfen wurde.

Software ist die “Achillesferse” der F-35
Die Fähigkeiten der F-35 werden einerseits durch ihre technische Ausstattung und verbaute Elektronik bestimmt (u.a. 31 PowerPC Prozessoren von IBM mit 75.000 MIPS), andererseits ist die darunterliegende Software zur Steuerung und Bedienung ein wesentliches Fähigkeitsmerkmal. Einzelne Entwicklungsstufen werden in Blöcken zusammengefasst, die je nach Teilstreitkraft auch Unterteilungen aufweisen können. Block 1 beschreibt Flugzeuge “der ersten Stunde”, die zu Trainings- und Erprobungszwecken gebaut wurden, Block 2 gewährte darüber hinaus schon grundlegende Waffenfunktionen, während Block 3F den zur Zeit aktuellen Softwarestand darstellt. Die interne Programmierung der F-35 umfasst mehr als 8 Mio. Zeilen Softwarecode, mehr als vier Mal soviel wie bei der F-22. Berücksichtigt man die Faustregel, dass selbst bei sensiblen Rüstungsaufträgen pro 1.000 Zeilen Code ein Programmierfehler auftritt, dann ist es wenig überraschend, dass für die aktuelle, als bedingt einsatzfähig deklarierte Version der Block 3F R6 Software mittlerweile die 31. Aktualisierung vorliegt, der noch weitere folgen werden. Die Block 3F Software war anfangs selbst für erste Testflüge viel zu unzuverlässig. Auch bei der aktuellen Version 3F R6.32 werden zur Zeit immer noch Programmierfehler entdeckt und beseitigt.

The mission systems software blocks being developed for the program, the percentage of test points completed by block, and the build-up to full warfighting capability with Block 3F (Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office [Public domain]).

The mission systems software blocks being developed for the program, the percentage of test points completed by block, and the build-up to full warfighting capability with Block 3F (Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office [Public domain]).

Wesentlich schwerwiegender ist aber das Fehlen der einsatzrelevanten Missionsdateien (Mission Data Loads – MDL). Sie enthalten umfangreiche Informationen z.B. über potentielle Ziele, gegnerische Kampfflugzeuge und sonstige mögliche Bedrohungen, wie etwa Flugabwehrstellungen, jeweils mit ihren elektronischen und/oder infraroten Signaturen, die vor jedem Einsatz in den Bordcomputer der F-35 geladen und nach jedem Einsatz aktualisiert werden müssen. Ohne diese MDL kann die F-35 weder ihre Ziele finden noch möglichen Bedrohungen entgehen. Ihre Tarnkappenfähigkeit hängt maßgeblich von den MDL ab, um optimale Flugrouten abseits gegnerischer Flugabwehr und Abfangjäger zu berechnen. Für jedes Einsatzgebiet muss ein gesondertes MDL mit einsatzspezifischen Informationen erstellt werden. Insgesamt werden für den weltweiten Einsatz und für den Abschluss der Test- und Erprobungsphase mindestens sechs solcher MDL gebraucht. Zumindestens das erste MDL für die anstehenden Serienreifetests in den USA soll im Laufe dieses Jahres fertiggestellt sein. Nur ein Standort in den USA ist zur Zeit in der Lage, die MDL für alle F-35 zu programmieren: das US Reprogramming Laboratory (USRL) auf der Eglin Air Force Base in Florida. Allerdings benötigt dieses “Labor” alleine für ein MDL 15 Monate, die Erstellung der erforderlichen sechs MDL würde somit theoretisch siebeneinhalb Jahre in Anspruch nehmen. Nicht einberechnet sind hierbei die erforderlichen Aktualisierungen bereits erstellter MDL durch die nach jedem Einsatz einer F-35 erlangten neuen Informationen über vorhandene bzw. zusätzliche Ziele und Bedrohungen, zu denen das USRL bislang gar nicht in der Lage ist, weil es mit unzureichender Software und veralteter bzw. unvollständiger Hardware arbeitet. Um die erstellten MDL auch eingehend testen zu können, benötigt das USRL zusätzlich spezielle Elektronik, sogenannte Bedrohungsemitter, die identische Signale erzeugen wie die zu erwartenen feindlichen Abfangjäger, Radarstellungen und Flugabwehrraketen in der potenziellen Kampfzone. Dem USRL fehlt aber laut Bericht des DOT&E bislang die erforderliche Anzahl an Emittern, um eine ausreichend bestückte elektronische Testumgebung zu schaffen, die den aktuell vorherrschenden globalen Bedrohungsszenarien auch nur annähernd entsprechen würde.

Ein weiterer wesentlicher Schwachpunkt des F-35 Projektes ist das ‘Autonomic Logistics Information System’ (ALIS), das im Eigentum der Herstellerfirma Lookheed Martin verbleibt und von dieser weltweit betrieben wird. Es handelt sich hierbei um ein komplexes Computersystem, bestehend aus 65 Einzelprogrammen mit 16 Mio. Zeilen Softwarecode, das fortlaufend Flugzeugdaten sammelt und analysiert. Es dient u.a. für die Einsatzplanung, Bedrohungsanalysen, Wartungsdiagnosen nebst -planung und für die Bestellung von Ersatzteilen. Alle F-35, auch die von Partnerländern bzw. Käufern außerhalb der USA, müssen ihre Missionsdateien nebst ALIS-Profilen vor und nach jedem Flug auf den neuesten Stand bringen. Hierfür werden die Daten aus jeder F-35 ausgelesen, danach über das Internet zunächst zum ALIS Mainframe nach Fort Worth in Texas geschickt, der diese dann u.a. an das USRL und Lockheed Martin weiterleitet. Von dort sollen dann zukünftig die aktualisierten Daten über den Mainframe zurück zu allen F-35, auch in Übersee, gelangen. Sollte die Internetverbindung aus den USA z.B. nach Europa durch Hackerangriffe auf Netzwerkknoten oder Sabotage der Unterseekabel unterbrochen werden, dann bleiben die vom ALIS ‘abgenabelten’ F-35 z.B. in Großbritannien, Italien und in der Türkei bis auf weiteres am Boden (Giovanni de Briganti, “US Software Stranglehold Threatens F-35 Foreign Operations“, Defense-Aerospace.com, 04.11.2015). Denn eine Datenübertragung via Satellit ist schon wegen des hohen Datenvolumens nur einer einzigen F-35 Staffel kaum möglich, wie Tests an Bord des Flugzeugträgers USS Washington im August 2016 zeigten. Es dauerte zwei ganze Tage, bedingt u.a. auch durch einsatztaktische “Funkstille”, eingeschränkte Bandbreiten und schlechte Satellitenverbindungen, um eine nur 200 MB große ALIS-Datei zu versenden. Wie diese Übertragungsprobleme zukünftig bei der Stationierung ganzer Staffeln von F-35 ‘B’/’C’ Modellen auf Flugzeug- und amphibischen Angriffsträgern gelöst werden sollen, bleibt abzuwarten. Der DOT&E forderte die USN insoweit zu weiteren Untersuchungen auf.

Portable maintenance device loaded with joint technical data and plugged into an F-35 (photo: Maj. Karen Roganov / U.S. Air Force [Public domain]).

Portable maintenance device loaded with joint technical data and plugged into an F-35 (photo: Maj. Karen Roganov / U.S. Air Force [Public domain]).

Der DOT&E weist in seinem Revisionsbericht aber noch auf weitere ALIS-Mängel hin. Nach dem letzten Update der Software musste die USMC Basis Yuma in Arizona im Juni 2017 den Flugbetrieb mit allen dort stationierten F-35 komplett einstellen, weil u.a. die Triebwerksdaten nicht ordnungsgemäß aufgezeichnet wurden. Darüber hinaus gibt ALIS fortlaufend falsche Werte über die Wartungs- bzw. Reparaturbedürftigkeit von Komponenten aus, die dann zu Flugzeugstilllegungen, Bestellungen nicht benötigter Ersatzteile und zeitaufwändigen aber sinnlosen Technikereinätzen führen. Manuelle Problemumgehungen und Eingriffe durch ALIS-Administratoren, die mittlerweile zum Wartungsalltag der Mechaniker gehören, sind für Vorgänge erforderlich, die eigentlich längst automatisiert ablaufen sollten. Schon in früheren Berichten bemängelte der DOT&E zudem die unzureichende Cybersicherheit der Soft- und Hardware gegenüber Hackerangriffen, sie sowohl das ALIS als auch die F-35 selbst betreffen. Diese längst bekannten Schwachstellen wurden auch im Berichtsjahr 2017 nicht beseitigt. Nunmehr empfiehlt der Revisor angesichts aktueller Cyberbedrohungen, ALIS z.B. bei Testflügen für den erlaubten Zeitraum von bis zu 30 Tagen besser ganz abzuschalten, was aber grundsätzlich nicht dem oben beschriebenen, notwendigen Zusammenwirken von ALIS und der F-35 entspricht, um effektive (Kampf-)Einsätze zu fliegen. Wohl auch aus diesen Gründen hat sich Israel vertraglich das Recht ausbedungen, wie bereits erwähnt, die Wartung ihrer F-35I Adir selbst zu übernehmen. Es herrscht dort die berechtigte Sorge, mitten in einem Konflikt keine F-35 mehr einsetzen zu können, weil ALIS durch Cyberangriffe kompromittiert wurde. Ob Israel deswegen mit ALIS außerhalb des globalen Netzwerkes bleibt oder gleich eine ganz eigene Wartungssoftware installiert hat, bleibt verständlicherweise geheim.

ALIS ist aber nicht nur Cyberbedrohungen im Internet ausgesetzt, es übermittelt auch selbst nach Auffassung einiger JSF-Partnerländer zu viele operative Daten nach jedem Flug einer F-35 an die U.S. Army sowie an die nichtstaatliche Herstellerfirma Lockheed-Martin und verletzt damit die Souveränität der am Projekt beteiligten Länder. Daher haben sich z.B. Italien, Norwegen und Australien entschieden, softwareseitig die Menge an sensiblen Daten, die zukünftig über ALIS in die USA übertragen werden sollen, zu beschränken. Darüber hinaus bauen Italien und Norwegen in den USA ein gemeinsames Software-Labor für die Programmierung von länderspezifischen Missionsdateien auf. Das ALIS-Netzwerk gewährt den USA bei Bedarf aber auch eine aktive Kontrolle über die bei den Partnerländern stationierten F-35 mit Hilfe der Verteilung von Updates und Patches der internen wie externen F-35 Software. ALIS könnte von den USA zukünftig zudem als “trojanisches Pferd” genutzt werden, um darüber Schadsoftware in die F-35 u.U. missliebig gewordener Partnerländer einzuspielen und diese softwareseitig lahmzulegen.

The F-35I Adir (accompanied by a F-16I Sufa) on its debut flight in Israel, December 2016 (photo: Major Ofer / Israeli Air Force [CC BY 4.0])

The F-35I Adir (accompanied by a F-16I Sufa) on its debut flight in Israel, December 2016 (photo: Major Ofer / Israeli Air Force [CC BY 4.0])


Die Zielerfassungs- und  Waffensysteme funktionieren nur eingeschränkt
Das “Electro-Optical Targeting System” (EOTS) ist ein Zielsystem auf Basis des bereits für die F-16 entwickelten Sniper Advanced Targeting Pod. Um die Tarnkappeneigenschaften zu bewahren, wurde auf einen externen Behälter verzichtet und das EOTS am Bug der F-35 in einer Kanzel aus Saphirglas in den unteren Flugzeugrumpf integriert. Es liefert über die Verbindung zum Zentralrechner mit Hilfe einer Videokamera, eines Infrarotsuch-/Verfolgungssystems (FLIR) und eines Entfernungs-/Zielbeleuchtungslasers die für die Bordwaffen erforderlichen Zielerfassungskoordinaten beim Luft- und Bodenkampf. Die so ermittelten Daten erhält der Pilot direkt auf das Visier seines Helmes übertragen. Ein Head-Up-Display (HUD – Frontscheibenprojektor) gibt es im Cockpit der F-35 nicht mehr. Laut Bericht des DOT&E aus dem Jahr 2016 erklärten die Testpiloten übereinstimmend, dass das integrierte EOTS leistungsschwächer sei, als das bei älteren Kampfjets der 4. Generation in einem externen Behälter mitgeführte. Gegner könnten in einer taktisch sinnvollen Entfernung nicht erkannt und identifiziert, Ziele während der Angriffsphase nicht dauerhaft mit dem Laser markiert werden. Umwelteinflüsse, wie z.B. hohe Luftfeuchtigkeit, würden die Piloten zwingen, dichter an potentielle Ziele heranzufliegen, als es eigentlich militärisch geboten wäre. Dies nehme der F-35 den Überraschungseffekt, warne mögliche Gegner unnötig vor, verlangsame den Feuerprozess und setze die F-35 zusätzlichen Bedrohungen im Zielgebiet aus. Im 2017er DOT&E Bericht wird weiter festgestellt, dass bewegliche Bodenziele mit dem EOTS nicht ausreichend zu erfassen sind. Die Piloten müssten beim Anvisieren mittels “Faustformeln” technische Defizite des EOTS ausgleichen, was unter realen Kampfbedingungen weder effektiv noch erlaubt sei. Aufgrund der bislang verbauten Elektronik werden sich diese Defizite des EOTS auch nicht mehr allein durch Software-Verbesserungen beheben lassen. Es überrascht daher nicht, dass Hersteller Lockheed Martin im September 2015 für die kommenden Block 4 Modelle der F-35 ein “Advanced EOTS” mit verbesserter Technik angekündigt hat, das jedoch erst ab 2020 verbaut werden kann.

Electro-optical target sensor (EOTS) on a mock-up of the F-35. Photo taken at RIAT 2007 (Source: Dammit, Wikimedia Commons, Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 2.5 Netherlands license)

Electro-optical target sensor (EOTS) on a mock-up of the F-35. Photo taken at RIAT 2007 (Source: Dammit, Wikimedia Commons, Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 2.5 Netherlands license)

Bei den Waffensystemen sieht es nicht unbedingt besser aus. Die F-35A ist für ihre vorgesehene Luftnahunterstützungsrolle u.a. mit einer internen, vierläufigen 25mm Gatlingkanone ausgerüstet. Bei den Waffentests im Jahr 2017 stellte sich heraus, dass diese zu weit und auch zu weit nach rechts feuert. Bei den in gesonderten Waffenbehältern der ‘B’ und ‘C’ Modelle mitgeführten Bordkanonen traten ebenfalls Trefferungenauigkeiten auf, wenn auch nicht so eklatant wie bei der ‘A’ Version. Die Fehler sind bislang bei keiner Version behoben.

Bei der AIM-120 Luft-/Luftrakete großer Reichweite (hinter dem Sichthorizont) ergaben die Waffentests Probleme mit der technischen Eingliederung und den Kontrollanzeigen in der F-35, die allesamt der Geheimhaltung unterliegen. Das veröffentliche Protokoll der Waffentests zeigt aber, dass Probeabschüsse der AIM-120 AMRAAM entweder ganz oder teilweise fehlschlugen bzw. die Bewertung der Ergebnisse noch andauert, was immer das heißen mag.

Weapons bay of a mock-up of the F-35. PPhoto taken at RIAT 2007 (Source: Dammit, Wikimedia Commons, Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 2.5 Netherlands license)

Weapons bay of a mock-up of the F-35. Photo taken at RIAT 2007 (Source: Dammit, Wikimedia Commons, Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 2.5 Netherlands license)

Bei den Tests der Luft-/Bodenwaffen wurden in Verbindung mit dem EOTS Defizite festgestellt, die den vollständigen und erfolgreichen Durchlauf der sogenannten “Bekämpfungsschleife”, bestehend aus Finden, Fixieren, Verfolgen, Zielen, Feuern und Bewerten verhindern und somit einen Waffeneinsatz erschweren, wenn nicht sogar unmöglich machen. So konnten die F-35 Piloten z.B. bei präzisionsgelenkten Bomben (JDAM) zwar die übermittelten, nicht aber die tatsächlich in der Bombe gespeicherten Zieldaten überprüfen. Die Einsatzregeln in Kampfzonen erfordern es in der Regel aber, dass der Pilot dem Fliegerleitoffizier (FAC) am Boden vor dem Waffeneinsatz die korrekten, in der Präzisionswaffe gespeicherten Zieldaten noch einmal ausdrücklich bestätigt.

Warnsystem “DAS” ist technisch veraltet und kämpft mit Produktionsfehlern
Für die Überwachung des Luftraumes um die F-35 herum wird ein aus sechs Infrarotkameras bestehendes, auf dem vorderen Flugzeugrumpf verteiltes “Distributed Aperture System” (DAS) eingesetzt (auf dem Bild unten ist eine DAS-Kamera direkt vor der Pilotenkanzel auf dem Bug zu erkennen). Es gewährt dem Piloten über ein auf das Helmvisier projiziertes Bild bei Tag und Nacht ein situatives Bewusstsein mittels eines sphärischen Rundumblicks, sogar bei einer Blickrichtung durch den Rumpf der F-35 hindurch nach unten, mit dem auch ein Navigieren bei völliger Dunkelheit mit Hilfe einer zusätzlich am Helm montierten Nachtsichtkamera möglich ist. Darüber hinaus erkennt/erfasst/bekämpft das DAS gegnerische Flugabwehr-/Radarstellungen, anfliegende Feindflugzeuge, gibt dem Piloten im Luftnahkampf eine permanente  Freund/Feind-Unterscheidung und leitet selbständig gegen erkannte Bedrohungen entsprechende Verteidigungsmaßnahmen ein (Infrarot-Täuschkörper, Düppel, elektronische Störung/Abwehr).

Beschädigte Glasabdeckungen bei den DAS-Kameras waren 2017 einer der Gründe, warum F-35 Kampfjets wiederholt von der USAF als nicht einsatzbereit eingestuft wurden, während sie bei der USN und dem USMC wenigstens noch als flugtauglich galten. Bei Nachtlandungen wurde dann aber zusätzlich festgestellt, dass in Verbindung mit der am Helm befindlichen Nachtsichtkamera bei völliger Dunkelheit (Neumond, kein Sternenlicht wegen starker Bewölkung, kein Zivilisationslicht) die Piloten das situative Bewusstsein aufgrund der schlechten Bild-/Auflösungsqualität der verbauten Infrarotkameras verloren, so dass ein sicheres Fliegen bzw. Landen für die Piloten mittels der von DAS/Helmkamera auf das Helmvisier übertragenen Außensicht nicht mehr möglich war.

F-35A front profile in flight. The doors are opened to expose the aerial refueling inlet valve (photo: MSgt John Nimmo Sr. [Public domain])

F-35A front profile in flight. The doors are opened to expose the aerial refueling inlet valve (photo: MSgt John Nimmo Sr. [Public domain])

Hier manifestieren sich gleich mehrere weitere Probleme bei der F-35: Neben immer wieder auch in anderen Bereichen auftretenden qualitativen Mängeln bei der Fertigung selbst (fehlerhafte DAS-Glasabdeckungen, technisch unzureichende Nachtsichtkamera, zu schnell verschleißende Reifen, mangelnder Korrosionsschutz, mechanisch labile Tanksonde), ist das aktuell verbaute DAS aufgrund der überlangen Erprobungsphase nebst Vorserienproduktion mehr als 10 Jahre im Einsatz und gilt nun als technisch veraltet, ähnlich wie bei dem oben bereits erwähnten EOTS. Hersteller Lockheed Martin kündigte im Juni 2018 an, ab 2023 für das Baulos 15 ein wesentlich verbessertes, leistungsstärkeres und billigeres DAS der Firma Raytheon zu verbauen. Da bis dahin aber die Serienproduktion bereits angelaufen sein dürfte, wird die F-35, u.a. durch den Einbau des verbesserten EOTS bzw. DAS, ab den 2020er Jahren in signifikant unterschiedlichen Hard- und Softwarekonfigurationen bei den fliegenden U.S. Teilstreitkräften im Einsatz sein. Ob auch die neuen elektronischen Bauteile ohne zusätzliche technische und softwarespezifische Probleme nahtlos in die F-35 integriert werden können, dürfte im Hinblick auf die bislang aufgetretenen Fehler zumindestens zweifelhaft sein. Auf jeden Fall aber wird ein Austausch von elektronischen Bauteilen alter und neuer Generation wegen der verschiedenen Softwareversionen innerhalb der F-35 Flotte nur sehr schwer, vermutlich aber gar nicht möglich sein.

VSI Helmet-mounted display system for the F-35 [Public domain]

VSI Helmet-mounted display system for the F-35 [Public domain]


Einsatzerfahrungen mit der F-35 zeichnen ein gänzlich anderes Bild
Aufsichts- und Kontrollbehörden im Allgemeinen, aber auch einige der schärfsten Kritiker im Besonderen, müssen sich entgegen halten lassen, “vom grünen Tisch” aus Urteile anhand umfangreicher Testprotokolle zu fällen, ohne selbst mit dem Gegenstand ihrer Prüfung bzw. Kritik eigene Erfahrungen gesammelt zu haben. Major Morten Hanche der Norwegische Luftstreitkräfte, Leiter der dortigen F-35 Test-/Evaluierungsabteilung, hat im Jahr 2016 mehrere interessante Blogbeiträge über seine Erfahrungen als ehemaliger F-16 und nunmehr aktueller F-35 Pilot veröffentlicht, denen die sonst übliche, entweder übertrieben positive oder negative Aufgeregtheit fehlen (siehe unter “Literaturverzeichnis”). Basierend auf seinen eigenen Erfahrungen mit der F-35A empfindet er die zumeist negativen Interpretationen der DOT&E Berichte durch die Medien als überzogen, weil sie gänzlich von unrealistischen Erwartungen ausgehen würden. Für ihn sei ein Mangel an Perfektion bei der F-35 kein Desaster. Er ist der Auffassung, dass gerade bei der Entwicklung und Erprobung eines so hochkomplexen Flugzeuges wie der F-35 immer Kompromisse eingegangen werden müssten. Für fast jeden auftretenden Fehler gebe es unter Einsatzbedingungen entweder eine Problemumgehung oder man lerne im Missionsalltag damit zu leben. Die F-35 funktioniere gut, selbst wenn sie (noch) nicht alle Spezifikationen erfülle. Er selbst sei beeindruckt von der F-35, vor allem in den Bereichen Geschwindigkeit, Dienstgipfelhöhe, Reichweite und Manövrierbarkeit, denn diese Eigenschaften könnten in Zukunft, im Gegensatz zu anderen Mängeln, nicht einfach durch Softwareupdates verbessert werden. Gegenüber der F/A-18 Hornet habe man das Gefühl “mit vier Triebwerken zu fliegen”. Auch könne er die Tarnkappenfähigkeiten der F-35 bestätigen, die im Gegensatz zur F-16 nicht schon aus größerer Entfernung zu orten sei. Ein Vergleich mit ausgereiften Kampfflugzeugen der 4. Generation sei nicht sachgerecht, weil diese bereits eine 40-jährige Fortentwicklungs- und Verbesserungsphase hinter sich hätten, um überhaupt auf den jetzigen Leistungsstand zu kommen, eine “Reifezeit”, die der F-35 bislang fehlen würde. Die F-16 sei bei ihrer Einführung in den 1970er Jahren fortdauernd von Fehlern und Defiziten geplagt gewesen, dennoch kann sie als eines der erfolgreichsten Kampfflugzeuge angesehen werden. Selbst heute noch würden die moderneren F-16 der Norwegische Luftstreitkräfte mit Mängeln bei der Avionik, Software und Logistik kämpfen, die nicht behoben werden, weil man deren Ursache bislang nicht ermitteln konnte oder bekannte Probleme aufgrund des fehlenden Kosten-/Nutzenverhältnisses gar ich nicht beseitigen will. Tatsächlich übererfülle die F-35 die an sie gestellten Erwartungen im Einsatz und besitze zudem eine hohe Wahrscheinlichkeit, im Ernstfall Kampfeinsätze auch zu “überleben”, ganz im Gegensatz zu Kampfjets der 4. Generation wie der F-16.

Lt. Col. Christine Mau, 33rd Operations Group deputy commander, puts on her helmet before taking her first flight in the F-35A on Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., May 5, 2015. Mau, who previously flew F-15E Strike Eagles, made history as the first female F-35 pilot in the program (photo: Staff Sgt. Marleah Robertson / U.S. Air Force)

Lt. Col. Christine Mau, 33rd Operations Group deputy commander, puts on her helmet before taking her first flight in the F-35A on Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., May 5, 2015. Mau, who previously flew F-15E Strike Eagles, made history as the first female F-35 pilot in the program (photo: Staff Sgt. Marleah Robertson / U.S. Air Force)

Ist die F-35 für die Luftwaffe das richtige Flugzeug?
Jedes größere Rüstungsprojekt im militärischen Flugzeugbau hatte bislang mit technischen Problemen, langen Verzögerungen, erheblichen Budgetüberschreitungen und harscher Kritik der Öffentlichkeit zu kämpfen, seien es nun F-15, F-16, F/A-18 auf amerikanischer oder Tornado, A-400 oder Eurofighter auf europäischer Seite. So darf es dann auch nicht überraschen, dass es bei einem so hochkomplexen Waffensystem wie der F-35 nicht anders kommen konnte. Als die F/A-18 bei der USN eingeführt wurde, fehlten ihr die Reichweite und Zuladung der A-7 Corsair sowie die Beschleunigung und Steigrate der F-4 Phantom. Heute ist die F/A-18 das Rückgrat der USN. Liest man beim letzten Bericht des DOT&E aus 2017 auch mal “zwischen den Zeilen”, ist selbst bei einer sehr pessimistischen Prognose davon auszugehen, dass spätestens ab 2025 die F-35 nicht nur die endgültige Serienreife längst erlangt hat, sondern – Dank des Austausches ganzer (elektronischer) Baugruppen und weiterer Software-Updates – auch einen Großteil ihrer technischen Probleme hinter sich gelassen haben dürfte. Dann besitzen die USA einen Kampfjet für das 21. Jahrhundert, mit dem die digitale und vernetzte Kriegsführung nicht nur ein Schlagwort, sondern Realität geworden ist. Auch im Hinblick auf den vermehrten Einsatz von (Letalen) Autonomen Waffensystemen (LAWS) im Verbund mit bemannten Kampfjets ist die F-35 die ideale Einsatzplattform zur Steuerung und Überwachung. Natürlich ist sie nicht unsichtbar (“stealth”), aber wahrscheinlich doch für die integrierte russische Flugabwehr schwerer zu orten (“stealthy”) als eine F/A-18 oder ein modernisierter Eurofighter. Und natürlich wird man mit der F-35 als Mehrzweckkampfflugzeug bei den Einzelaufgaben Luftnahunterstützung, -überlegenheit und -angriff Kompromisse eingehen müssen, aber das ist schon seit der Tornado eigentlich nichts wirklich Neues. Schließlich wird der Preis für die F-35 bis 2025 auf unter 80 Mio. US$ gefallen sein, was sicherlich kein “Schnäppchen” ist, aber doch deutlich günstiger als die aktuellen 95 Mio. US$. Da viele europäische NATO-Staaten ebenfalls die F-35 angeschafft haben oder anschaffen wollen, wäre erstmals seit langem wenigstens im Bereich der NATO Luftwaffen eine teilweise Harmonisierung beim verwendeten Militärgerät zu verzeichnen, wenn auch zu Lasten der angestrebten Unabhängigkeit Europas von den USA im Verteidigungsbereich.

Wie immer bei großen Rüstungsprojekten gibt es bei der Beschaffung eines solch teueren, technisch komplexen Waffensystems kein einfaches “ja” oder “nein”. Deutschland wird mit seiner Entscheidung in dieser Frage weder die USA noch Frankreich außen- wie militärpolitisch brüskieren wollen, sind sie doch beide wichtige Bündnispartner innerhalb der NATO und EU. Frankreich hatte bereits angekündigt, beim Kauf der F-35 durch Deutschland die Planung des zukünftigen gemeinsamen europäischen Jagdflugzeuges sofort zu beenden. Andererseits würde der geplante deutsch-französische Kampfjet der 5./6. Generation vermutlich viel zu spät seine Einsatzreife erlangen, um die Tornados der Luftwaffe bis 2025 rechtzeitig abzulösen. Die USA wiederum könnten eine Freigabe des Eurofighters für die nukleare Teilhabe auf 7-10 Jahre hinauszögern, um Deutschland zum Kauf der F-35A zu drängen, mit dem berechtigten Argument, selbst ein modifizierter Eurofighter wäre kein taugliches Trägersystem für amerikanische Atombomben, da er den modernen russischen Flugabwehrsystemen S-400/S-500 nicht gewachsen sei. Das gleiche Problem besteht beim Tornado aber mittlerweile wohl auch. Am besten also gleich ganz auf die nukleare Teilhabe mit den USA verzichten und mit Frankreich einen gemeinsamen Kampfjet bauen, der dann für Deutschland französische Atombomben ins Ziel tragen würde? Eine Variante, die im Hinblick auf die europäische bzw. deutsche Abhängigkeit vom US Atomschirm für eine glaubhafte nukleare Abschreckung in Europa eher unwahrscheinlich ist.

U.S. Government [Public domain]

U.S. Government [Public domain]

Dann besser doch dem Beispiel der Briten, Dänen, Norweger, Niederländer und Italiener in Europa folgen und eine technisch (bislang noch nicht) ausgereifte F-35 kaufen, die  zudem mit hohen Folgekosten für Wartung und Flugbetrieb daher kommt? Oder vielleicht eher eine “salomonische Lösung”, bei der Deutschland für eine geschätzte Übergangszeit von ca. 15 bis 20 Jahren bis zur Serien-/Einsatzreife des geplanten deutsch-französischen Kampfflugzeuges die amerikanische F/A-18 Super Hornet beschafft? Keine einfache politische Entscheidung, die das Verteidigungsministerium in naher Zukunft wird treffen müssen.

Die F-35 ist wohl kein rüstungspolitisches Desaster, auch wenn sie bislang noch nicht alle die in sie gestellten Erwartungen erfüllen kann. Sie ist teuer, dafür aber ein (fast) einsatzbereites Stealth-Mehrzweckkampfflugzeug der 5. Generation, das bis 2025 seine “Kinderkrankheiten” hinter sich gelassen haben dürfte und der Luftwaffe dann einen erheblichen militärischen Mehrwert liefern könnte. Ich für meinen Teil muss gestehen, dass mein Herz in dieser rüstungspolitischen Frage mehr transatlantisch für die F-35 schlägt als paneuropäisch für einen modifizierten Eurofighter bzw. das Future Combat Air System (FCAS).

Weitere Informationen
Lockheed Martin, “F-35 Lightning II program status and fast facts“, 11.09.2018

Literaturverzeichnis

Posted in Armed Forces, International, Roger Näbig, Technology | Tagged , , , , , , , | 5 Comments

In the 1970s the Shah sought to make Iran a military superpower

by Paul Iddon.

While it almost seems ironic in retrospect, Iran was by far the biggest recipient of American, and British weaponry in the 1970s and was rapidly becoming a major power. Awash with petrodollars as a result of the global increase in the price of oil in the aftermath of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and at the height of his power the last Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi bought some of the most advanced weapons in the world for the Iranian military. While he did succeed in making Iran one of the best equipped militaries in the region, in terms of both quality and quantity, projections from the 1970s made it clear that he had grander plans to make Iran into one of the most powerful conventional military forces in the world.

Son and Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi kisses his fater's (Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi) hand after he flew past the royal stand in a Phantom jet in 1977. Queen Farah Pahlavi looks on.

Son and Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi kisses his father’s (Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi) hand after he flew past the royal stand in a Phantom jet in 1977. Queen Farah Pahlavi looks on.

 

1 – Buildup

The Shah openly said at the time that he wanted to make the Iranian armed forces “probably the best non-atomic” military in the world (Maziar Bahari, “Fall of a Shah – part 1“, BBC World News, 2009). He essentially sought to make Iran the most powerful regional country as well as capable of projecting power far beyond the immediate Persian Gulf region.

Original projections from the time, widely reported in the Western press, showed just how insanely manic this buildup was in all sectors of the Iranian military. He sought to transform the Imperial Iranian Navy (IIN) into not only the predominate force in the Persian Gulf — following Britain’s departure from that strategic region in 1971 and the ensuing power vacuum — but a naval force capable of patrolling the Indian Ocean. He transformed the Imperial Iranian Air Force (IIAF) into the best equipped air force in the entire region, aside from Israel, and Iran was the only country in history the U.S. ever sold Grumman F-14 Tomcats air superiority fighter jets to. On the eve of the Iranian Revolution, the country’s army was described as the fifth largest in the world. Had the Shah’s ambitions been fulfilled, it would likely have been far larger with an enormous fleet of modern tanks and helicopters.

“By the early 80s, if Iran continues ordering at the pace of the past few years – and there is every reason to think it will – the total tank strength may well be more than 5,000. That is as many as are owned by Britain, France and Italy combined,” estimated one report from the time (Edward Cochrand, “Iran packs a new punch”, The Guardian, July 23, 1975). Britain sought to sell Iran as many as 1,200 Chieftain main battle tanks to augment an existing 1,360-strong armoured fleet, which would have given Iran’s ground forces approximately 3,000 tanks – primarily Chieftains and US-made M60 Pattons. “Only the U.S. and Russia, whose front-line tank strength usually is over the 15,000 mark, have larger tank forces,” noted another report at the time (Ernest Volkman, “Iran may buy 1,200 tanks”, Newsday, May 26, 1976). Ultimately it did not get that far: in the mid 1970s, Iran had 460 M60 Pattons’, supplemented by 400 older M47/48 Pattons’, and took delivery of almost 900 Chieftains before the revolution. Initially, Tehran wanted to buy more M60s but the Pentagon was busy replenishing its own stocks, having hastily shipped several of the tanks to Israel during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.

F-14 Tomcat of the Iranian Air Force at the 8th Tactical Air Base in Isfahan. According to Military Balance 2018, Iran is still using 43 F-14.

F-14 Tomcat of the Iranian Air Force at the 8th Tactical Air Base in Isfahan. According to Military Balance 2018, Iran is still using 43 F-14.

“The army’s fleet of more than 500 helicopters, soon to be 800, is said to be the largest anywhere outside the United States,” estimated another report from that period (Keyes Beech, “Shah of Iran Buys Way to Military Dominance”, Chicago Daily News, July 06, 1977). This helicopter fleet consisted of 205 AH-1J SuperCobra attack helicopters, a total of 90 CH-47C Chinooks built by Italy’s Elicotteri Meridionali, 20 of which were designated to serve in the air force, and an assortment of Bell helicopters (295 Bell 214 A, 50 AB-205A and 20 AB-206).

The Shah, himself a skilled pilot, also sought to make Iran’s air force one of the most powerful in the world in terms of both quality and quantity. His ambitions for this branch of the military were also enormous, as one estimate put it: “Iran plans, by 1980, to have more fighter-bombers than any member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization except the United States.” (Beech, 1977) The backbone of the IIAF consisted of 188 F-4D/E Phantom IIs and 166 F-5E/F Tiger II jets. Additionally, the Shah bought 80 F-14 Tomcats, taking delivery of 79 of them before his fall, along with hundreds of long-range AIM-54 Phoenix air-to-air missile to deter Soviet overflights of Iranian airspace, which they did using their then new MiG-25 Foxbats – until 1976, the fastest warplane in the world. This stupendously expensive Iranian order essentially saved the F-14 program since the Grumman Corporation hitherto hadn’t the capital to go ahead with the program. By late 1977 an average of six F-14s were produced each month, three of which went to the U.S. Navy and three to Iran, underscoring just how major an arms client Iran was at the time.

Artist impression of how the Iranian F-16s would have looked, if they would have been delivered. You can clearly see the shape of the early YF-16 design.

Artist impression of how the Iranian F-16s would have looked, if they would have been delivered. You can clearly see the shape of the early YF-16 design.

The Shah’s ambitions to make the IIAF a world-class air force did not stop there. He had grand plans to gradually phase out Iran’s F-4 and F-5s with F-16 Fighting Falcons and a proposed land-based variant of the F-18 Hornet (then under development) that ultimately never saw the light of day. Tehran sought 300 F-16s in two delivery batches. The first batch consisted of 160 of the jets which the Shah did successfully order. Then U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger sought to deflect concerns at the time that Iran simply did not have the technical know-how and skilled personnel to absorb large numbers of advanced equipment by stressing that only 10 of the jets, for use as trainers, would begin arriving in 1979 while the other 150 would be delivered by 1984 (Bernard Gwertzman, “U.S. to sell Iran 160 F16 fighters”, New York Times Service, August 28, 1976). Ultimately Iran never received a single unit of the iconic jet fighter due to the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Even before that, however, there were doubts that the second batch of 140 F-16s would ever be delivered following the electoral victory of U.S. President Jimmy Carter, who sought to curb foreign arm sales during his campaign — during which he severely criticized Iran’s vast arms purchasing (“Half of Iran’s F16 order may never arrive”, UPI, June 10, 1977).

Tehran also wanted a whopping 250 F-18s. The U.S. Navy at the time wanted 800 F-18s for its aircraft carriers. Iran proposed providing the Northrop Corporation $8 million to develop the land-based variant, referred to in the press at the time as the F-18L, which would have been lighter than the naval version (“Iran Offers F18 Aid”, UPI, October 28, 1976). This was quite unusual, since the Pentagon never permitted a foreign government to finance the creation of a warplane. The Shah ultimately proved no exception to this rule. While the U.S. Navy supported the development of the F-18L for Iran, believing that it would reduce the cost of production for its own F-18As, the Carter administration ruled out the sale. Carter did not want to promote foreign sales to lower the cost of equipment for the U.S. military, sought to prevent arms sales that did not contribute to U.S. security and outright forbid the “development or significant modification of advanced weapon systems solely for export.” (Charles W. Corddry, “US denies Iran’s bid for 250 jets”, Washington Bureau of The Sun, June 18, 1977). Furthermore, the Pentagon clearly never took the idea very seriously. “The Pentagon’s relaxed treatment of the matter is evident in its failure even to estimate the total price of 250 Northrop F-18Ls, including spare parts, ground-support equipment and crew training,” noted one news report. “Mr. Carter nevertheless stands to gain from this seeming early test of his new policy on foreign arms sales. And by informed accounts, the Shah of Iran probably is not miffed.” (Corddry, 1977).

USAF E3 Sentry AWACS plane similar to the kind the Shah sought to buy.

USAF E3 Sentry AWACS plane similar to the kind the Shah sought to buy.

Tehran also tried to buy seven Boeing 707 AWACS for $1.2 billion, which would have enabled it to coordinate its enormous air force more effectively to intercept any airbourne intruders, or potentially plan a major offensive action against its neighbours (“AWACS for Iran”, The New York Times, September 9, 1977).

The Shah’s naval ambitions were not just limited to Iran’s Persian Gulf shores. The Iranian ruler was also “formulating plans to make his nation a permanent maritime presence in the Indian Ocean by 1980.” In the mid-1970s he “talked of the possibility of a trilateral security force composed of Australian, South African and Iranian warships to protect the sea lanes.” (“Iran’s Navy Becoming Formidable Force”, The Associated Press, October 6, 1975). In the Gulf, Iran had 14 British-built hovercrafts along with four Saam-class frigates, which it planned to augment with at least four Spruance-class destroyers from the U.S. and three Tang-class vintage diesel submarines. While Iran never received those last two orders it did later, under the current regime, purchase 3 Russian-made Kilo-class submarines in the 1990s. A naval exercise in the Gulf in November 1972 saw no fewer than 40 ships participate, including “two new British-built destroyers”. (“Iran shows navy’s strength”, The Associated Press, November 9, 1972).

Iran’s hovercraft fleet consisted of British-built 8 SR.N6s and 6 BH.7 Wellingtons. The BH.7s could carry over 50 tons while the SR.N6s could carry a much more modest 10 tons. While lightly armoured they were speedy and could drop troops at the other side of the Persian Gulf in about a half an hour. They were based on Iran’s Kharg island in the northern part of the Gulf. (Anthony H Cordesman, “Iran’s Military Forces in Transition: Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction“, March 30, 1999, p. 195).

BH.7 Wellington hovercraft of the IIN, Kharg Island Oct 1971.

BH.7 Wellington hovercraft of the IIN, Kharg Island Oct 1971.

 

2 – Support

Such an enormous build-up of large quantities of sophisticated hardware in such a short space of time obviously needed skilled personnel to help train the Iranians on how to operate and maintain their new weapon systems. Indeed, one recurring theme in press reports from the 1970s concerned Iran’s reported inability to absorb such advanced hardware in such short notice. “Some estimates are that 150,000 Americans will be in Iran by 1980 performing defence-related roles,” complained U.S. Senator Dale Bumpers. “Are we sacrificing our training needs and consequently our preparedness by making these sales?” (Peter J. Ognibene, “Should We Be No. 1 in Arms Sales?”, Syndicated column, July 10, 1977). The U.S. General Accounting Office also concluded that Washington “extensive sale” of military equipment and know-how “could adversely affect the readiness status of United States forces.” (Jack Anderson and Les Whitten, “U.S. Fears Shah Plans Oil Takeover”, Syndicated column, July 31, 1975).

Bumpers’ prediction, made in 1977, demonstrably shows how the Shah’s manic military build-up required tens-of-thousands of U.S.-american contractors and military advisors to sustain. The estimates for the total number of U.S. military personal “including advisors, mechanics and maintenance personnel” at the end of 1973 was a mere 1,200 (“U.S. Helping Iran Military Program”, UPI, July 4, 1973). At 52,000 U.S.-Americans in the country circa 1977, Iran was home to the largest expatriate community in the world. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee estimated that “it is unlikely that Iran could go to war in the next five to 10 years […] without U.S. support on a day-to-day basis.” (Ognibene, 1977).

It was not uncommon in the mid to late 1970s to have large amounts of hardware and munition simply “piling up on Iranian docks and fields”. As a result of this “Iranian air crews simply can’t be trained fast enough to operate all the aircraft that the eager Shah has thrust upon them,” wrote journalist Jack Anderson at the time. “They were just learning to fly the F-4s when the Shah began buying F-5Es. Before the F-5E crews are broken in; the still more advanced F-14s will begin arriving. […] The Shah has bitten off more than he can digest,” a source told Anderson while another admitted that, “[w]e are projecting a massive snafu.” (Jack Anderson, “U.S. Will Cure Iran’s Military Headache”, Syndicated column, September 25, 1975).

It was also estimated in 1976 that if the U.S. immediately stopped selling arms to Iran “although the Shah is considering buying 250 to 300 more U.S.-fighter planes, plus much other equipment — it would be five years or more before Iran could have the necessary expertise to operate the weapons systems she already has.” (Tom Wicker, “President and Shah”, The New York Times, August 9, 1976).

The Grumman Corporation released a promotional video in 1977 showcasing its projects in Iran, including the modern 1970s suburban homes built for its contractors in Iran and the durable F-14s Iran was beginning to operate. It points out that most of the students in the program had little more than a “high school education” (see after 10′ in the video above). One instructor shown in the video points out that they were there to ultimately “work ourselves out of a job” (see after 12’29” in the video above).

Around the same time reporter James Yuenger visited Iran, including the massive Khatami Air Base outside of Isfahan, and made similar observations to those by Anderson. “Without another decade of extensive on-the-spot training by thousands of American personnel ranging from computer analysts to grease monkeys, the shah of Iran cannot hope to make use of all the billions of dollars worth of sophisticated U.S. weapons he has purchased and is hoping to purchase,” Yuenger wrote. He also cited a systems programmer who went so far as to say that the U.S. “was trying to run space-age programs in a medieval society.” (James Yeunger, “Costly war machine needs Yanks to crank it”, Chicago Tribune, January 9, 1978).

In late 1977 one of Iran’s F-14s stalled and went into a flat-spin. Fearing that they could not pull out of it on time the pilot and his backseat radar intercept officer ejected leaving the plane to crash. One anonymous observer confided to Yuenger that “[a]fter they bailed out the goddamnest thing happened: That aircraft pulled out of the stall and levelled out by itself. The avionics in there are so good that there’s no way they should have ejected.” [Emphasis in original]. “So the plane flew along for a while,” he continued. “And then, of course, because the pilot had bailed out, it crashed. And there went 25 million bucks down the tube. Stupid!” (Yeunger, 1978).

The year beforehand the Shah himself went to see a test firing of an AGM-65 Maverick air-to-ground missile fired from six miles away. Instead of hitting its designated target, it made a “ninety degree” turn and headed toward the pavilion where the Shah and his accompanying generals were surveying the test hitting the ground and exploding nearby, the shock-waves almost collapsing the pavilion structure. Unfazed the Shah ordered an immediate resumption of tests, which were all a success (Andrew Scott Cooper, “The Fall of Heaven: The Pahlavis and the Final Days of Imperial Iran“, August 2, 2016, p.30).

Tehran also employed U.S.-civilians to teach its military helicopter tactics. Delk M. Oden, a retired U.S. Army Major General, the then president of Bell Helicopter International put together a 1,500-man civilian task force “to help create the Iran Sky Cavalry brigade, a strike force using helicopter gunships and assault helicopters modeled after the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division that fought in Vietnam’s highlands.” The contract to provide those helicopters, however, was made directly between Bell Helicopter and Tehran. Iran bought 489 Bell helicopters in 1973 “but the aviator task force did not come under U.S. government control because no weapons were involved.” (“Iran’s Army Trained by Ex-Army Aviators”, The Associated Press, February 11, 1975).

Aside from U.S. helicopter pilots one industrial recruiting firm put an ad in “The Washington Post” in 1977 seeking to recruit 20 former U.S. Navy F-14 pilots to train Iranian pilots. Ted Raymoud, the president of the recruiting firm, General Devices Inc., received several phone calls from reporters inquiring about what it was about. “They probably thought we were trying to start a war,” he said, going on to stress that, “[t]hese are no mercenaries. They’re strictly to teach, to instruct.” (“Wanted: Some pilots for Iran”, The Philadelphia Inquirer, August 11, 1977). Any qualified American F-14 pilot who signed up, would have received a $50,000 salary (worth over $200,000 today) plus free accommodation and other benefits. Raymond explained how difficult it was to find qualified personnel as well as convince them to move to Iran for the duration of the program. Living in Iran “is okay as long as you can acquire a taste for the local food – rice, lamb, yogurt. But if you want to buy a jar of peanut butter, it’ll cost you $5,” he noted.

 

3 – Reactions

Such a huge program, unsurprisingly, drew mixed responses and a fair amount of skepticism and criticism in the U.S. Government and the U.S. press. An editorial written by a senior staff member of the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University in late 1974 cited several “double standards” in press coverage. The analyst argues that, “even though India’s economy is in shambles and starvation is blighting its population centers, Prime Minister [Indira] Ghandi’s decision to invest scarce resources in a nuclear option generally seems to have been taken in stride by American observers. By contrast, the Shah’s purchases of conventional weapons – purchases that, incidentally, he can afford – evoke charges of ‘irrationality’.” [Emphasis in original] (Alvin J. Cottrell, “Explaining Iran”, Washington Post Service, December 23, 1974).

A 1976 editorial in the “Christian Science Monitor” also questioned if the U.S. was getting the best deal possible for selling billions worth of weapons to Iran while the Shah sought to keep the price of oil high. The article noted that “[i]f Saudi Arabia needs to buy some $2 billion worth of American weapons a year, a case can certainly be made for Iran needing even more”, pointing out that Iran had a far larger population and sat on strategic territory long coveted by the Soviet Union. However, it pointed to the fact that Riyadh at that time had “consistently restrained those OPEC countries who have been loudest for higher prices” while “Iran has usually been loud in its demands for the higher prices.” (Joseph C. Harsh, “U.S.-Iran arms-oil swap: Are we getting the best deal possible?”, Christian Science Monitor News Service, August 20, 1976).

Cartoon criticizing U.S. policy towards Iran in 1976.

Cartoon criticizing U.S. policy towards Iran in 1976.

The author went on to argue that it is within the U.S. interest to keep supplying Iran to make it a strong enough power “to defend itself and to contribute to stability in the Persian Gulf”, citing the common argument at the time that if Iran did not get its weapons from the U.S. it would get them from elsewhere, possibly even Moscow “as a last resort”. The articles concludes by arguing that “it is reasonable to hope that if they are to get all the super weapons they have on order, they will from now on be a force working toward oil-price restraint.” (Harsh, 1976).

A Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee panel also investigated, in the summer of 1976, the beginning of the Shah’s vast arms build-up during the Nixon administration and argued that there is little evidence to suggest that neither U.S. President Richard Nixon nor U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger “recognized the far-reaching policy implications of the U.S.-Iranian military relationship.” A staff report of the subcommittee, headed by U.S. Senator Hubert Humphrey, also pointed to the lack of trained personnel Iran had to operate its hi-tech F-14s and even warned of the potential of U.S. advisors becoming “hostages” in Iran were a military crisis to develop (“Panel is looking into fighter-jet sale to Iran”, The Associated Press, August 8, 1976). An editorial shortly thereafter evaluated U.S. military sales to Iran and concluded by suggesting that “Congress would do well to monitor and question the arms sales to Iran, but not summarily cut them off. Available evidence indicates the United States will continue to need Iran as a defense buffer, and as a friend, in a troubled region where we otherwise are toothless.” (“Iran’s arms buildup”, Arizona Republic, September 2, 1976).

By the following summer Carter was president and the potential sale of AWACS planes to Iran invoked substantial debate in the U.S. Congress. One editorial pointed out that the AWACS planes were at that time “the exclusive property of the U.S. intelligence services” and can “keep track of air warfare and in some ways control it.” The editorial also noted that U.S. “introduction of the new weapon to the Persian Gulf area would cause greater destruction should a war break out there”, warning that “Iran could use the AWACS offensively; the weapon could convince the Shah he is able to start a war.” It addressed another point raised by critics and skeptics of the sale at the time, the prospect that the Soviets could somehow procure the technology. “Mismanagement, crashes or Soviet spying could result in a breach of national security,” it warned, before going on to lambast the Shah as a tyrant “who probably does not deserve the kind of American help he has been getting.” (“Case Strong Against AWACS for Iran”, The Decatur Daily Review, August 9, 1977)

IIAF F-14 Tomcats in the 1970s.

IIAF F-14 Tomcats in the 1970s.

U.S. Senator John Culver, went so far as to call Carter’s proposed sale “insane”. While testifying this during a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the subject the senator “dropped a freshly lighted cigar to repeatedly attack the plan to sell the AWACS to Iran as ‘insane’ and ‘ridiculous’.” Culver’s main concern was the aforementioned potential of the Soviets acquiring the technology, arguing it would enable them to “punch the eyes out” of the U.S. military, adding that he doesn’t “want to go to those funerals”. He also presciently went on to question what he called the “superficial stability” of the Shah’s regime. “We don’t know which way the guns will point if the regime changes hands over night.” (“Culver calls plan to sell AWACS to Iran ‘insane'”, The Register’s Washington Bureau, July 19, 1977).

U.S. Senator Henry M. Jackson, on the other hand, argued in a report prepared by the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, that the U.S. has “a direct interest” in seeing to it that Iran has sufficient military forces to prevent the Soviets “or radical forces from taking power in any of the oil-rich Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia.” The report went on to suggest “that the United States should condone an Iranian invasion of Saudi Arabia in certain circumstances”, in particular “[i]f Iran is called upon to intervene in the internal affairs of any (Persian) Gulf state, it must be recognized in advance by the United States that this is the role for which Iran is being primed.” (“Senate Report Backs Iranians Against Saudis”, The Washington Post, December 25, 1977).

Little more than a year later U.S. Senator William Proxmire, a member of the U.S. Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense who was famous for his critiques of government overspending, said that the U.S. should deny an Iranian request for more F-14s and for over one hundred F-16s, arguing, in a statement released from his office, that “Iran has no further need for sophisticated aircraft unless it is for aggressive purposes. […] Iran is loaded with American military equipment – far beyond its own defensive needs.” He went on to argue that none of its regional neighbours posed a “direct threat. Only the Soviet Union could challenge and overwhelm Iran militarily. And no amount of U.S. aid or sales could redress that fact of life.” (“Proxmire asks Iran F-14 request denied”, UPI, May 28, 1978).

 

4 – Arms races

The Shah of Iran oversees his navy when Tehran was America's gendarme in the Persian Gulf in the 1970s (Screenshot from BBC documentary "The Last Shah").

The Shah of Iran oversees his navy when Tehran was America’s gendarme in the Persian Gulf in the 1970s (Screenshot from BBC documentary “The Last Shah“).

The Shah’s enormous arms build-up was motivated by a variety of factors. For one Iran was engaged in a tense border dispute with Iraq in the 1970s over the Shatt al-Arab waterway. The Shah consequently oversaw a covert supply program to the Iraqi Kurds to keep Baghdad bogged down within its own frontiers and then cynically dumped them to make a deal, the Algiers Agreement of 1975, over the status of the strategic waterway with then Iraqi Vice President Saddam Hussein to buy time and make the Iranian military even stronger.

Aside from tensions with Iraq, which ultimately sparked the vicious Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s shortly after the Iranian Revolution, the Shah also saw India as a potential threat and feared the Pakistani state fragmenting and openly said he would contemplate intervening forcefully if that happened. The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, which saw Pakistan’s exclave “East Pakistan” secede from Islamabad and become Bangladesh, clearly worried the Iranian monarch. “We saw organized armies crossing international boundaries and nobody did anything about it, not even the United States, while the mass media for the most part applauded this illegality, I opposed Pakistan’s military intervention in Bangladesh,” the Shah said in retrospect. “But the India-Pakistan war more than ever reinforced our resolve to strengthen Iran’s defenses.” [Emphasis by the author] The Shah’s stated goal throughout the 1970s was to make Iran strong enough to defend against any adversary in a non-nuclear war. “That’s my ultimate aim,” he said. “Some people laughed when I started off this program. But now I estimate we are only five years away from our goal.” Pahlavi even reserved the right to seize Pakistan’s Baluchistan territories if the country were to fragment. “We must see to it that Pakistan doesn’t fall to pieces,” he insisted, before adding that, “[t]he least we could do [in such a situation] in our own interest would be some kind of protective reaction in Baluchistan.” (“Iran keeps its powder dry”, The New York Times, April 26, 1973).

At the same time Baghdad Radio was attempting to stir-up separatist sentiments among Iran’s own Baluch population in the southeast. The Shah himself feared his covert war with Iraq could quickly escalate into an actual war. A U.S. intelligence assessment noted that Tehran’s support to those Kurds “reached a level comparable to that of Indian involvement with the Bengalee [sic] rebels in East Pakistan just prior to the 1971 war.” (Roham Alvandi, “Nixon, Kissinger and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the the Cold War“, Oxford University Press, November 2016, p. 110).

Tehran’s military buildup, even before it was accelerated in the aftermath of the oil crisis, “frightened India into revising its calculations of its own defence needs.” (“Pakistan’s protective ally, Iran”, The Economist, July 19, 1973). By 1974 India had demonstrated to the world that it possessed a nuclear capability through its “Smiling Buddha” bomb test on May 18, 1974. Earlier U.S. and European officials feared that Tehran’s conventional build-up, which in the early 1970s was turning it into “the primary military power between Israel and India”, coupled with the Shah’s “protective attitude” to Pakistan “could promote an arms race between Iran and India.” It was noted in 1973 that while the Indian military was larger it was nevertheless “in some vital areas, less sophisticated.” The Indian Army had 826,000 troops at the time while Iran had a far smaller 160,000. New Delhi possessed “1,700 tanks and 842 combat aircraft, compared with Iran’s 920 and 145.” Nevertheless, were Tehran to have deployed its modern air force along with its fleet of Chieftains, it would have had “a qualitative edge in both weapons systems.” (“Iran arms race with India is feared”, New York Times News Service, July 22, 1973). However, India’s possession of an actual arms industry, which enabled it to domestically build MiG-21 fighter-bombers among other things, and shortly thereafter the nuclear bomb, arguably would have compensated for Iran’s technological edge were a major war between them to actually break out.

While in the 1970s the Shah’s primary aim was no longer to combat a direct Soviet threat to Iran, relations were quite cordial by that time, he still worried that his country “might be outflanked – by Soviet support of Gulf Arab ‘liberation’ movements or conversely, by a Soviet ideological drive to the east through Afghanistan to aid separatist movements in Pakistan’s Baluchistan.” (“Iran Seeks to Extend Power Sphere”, Los Angeles Times, July 30, 1975). The Shah intervened in Oman to help Muscat quash a Communist insurgency. He was also later revealed to have offered to return the exiled Afghan monarch Zahir Shah to Afghanistan, have him request Iranian support to reinstall him, and then militarily intervene in the country – where he sought to preempt any potential Soviet incursion. That never materialized. (Mentioned in Professor Abbas Milani’s 2011 lecture: “The Shah and Ayatollahs: Ruptures and Continuities in Iranian Politics“, Center for Middle Eastern and North African Studies, University of Michigan, 17.03.2011, 42’57”.)

In 1973 the Shah also sought to exert his control over the Persian Gulf by controlling shipping through the strategic Strait of Hormuz entrance along with Oman. The proposal came a week after the Shah expressed his displeasure to Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin “over the presence of Soviet military ships in the Gulf” and also “about Soviet involvement in the building of a new Iraqi port at Um Qasr.” (“Iran trying to control Persian Gulf shipping”, Washington Post News Service, March 23, 1973).

In the mid-1970s the Shah’s bid to buy nuclear reactors to further modernize his country led to some projections that he would soon have the potential to make Iran a nuclear power. Journalist Frances Fitzgerald even predicted, in December 1974, that “[i]n a few years Iran will have the capacity to manufacture the atom bomb, and by then it will have the delivery system that can reach all the way to Moscow. It will also have the depth of military equipment to fight a protracted conventional war against one or more of its neighbours.” (Frances Fitzgerald, “Giving the Shah Everything He Wants”, Harper’s Magazine, December 1974).

Later when the Carter administration refused to sell the Shah Pershing missiles, Iran engaged in a secret program with Israel to build such missiles, known as Project Flower, after Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizman advised Iranian General Hassan Toufanian that “[a] country like yours, with F-14s, with so many F-4s, with problems surrounding you, [must have] a good missile force.” (Trita Parsi, “Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States“, Yale University Press, December 3, 2007, p.75). Ultimately Project Flower, which was to see Israel provide the technology in return for oil, never saw the light of day as a result of the Iranian Revolution.

Illustration with Erdman's fictional story in New York Magazine showing depicting a unilateral Iranian invasion of Iraq in 1976.

Illustration with Erdman’s fictional story in New York Magazine depicting a unilateral Iranian invasion of Iraq in 1976.

Iran’s military build-up even inspired a fictional scenario whereby the Shah would use his newfound wealth to make Iran a world power of the kind it was in the times of Ancient Persia and destroy the Western world’s industrialized economies in the process. Writer Paul Erdman’s 1974 story was called “The Oil War of 1976: How the Shah Won the World“. In it he used publicly available information about Iran’s military arsenal to write what he deemed a realistic war scenario. Erdman’s story is a retrospective of the 1976 war from the then future modern day of 1984. The Shah’s build-up of the day is even compared with Hitler’s military buildup before invading Europe. Erdman quoted real-life statements made by the Shah at the time and accurately described the weapon systems he was buying – the story adds one major fictional element, the Shah’s leasing of the aircraft carriers USS Kitty Hawk and USS Constellation. The Iranian leader begins his war by making a deal with the Soviet Union to stand aside while he uses his massive arsenal of U.S.-American weapons to preemptively attack Iraq and then seize the entire Gulf region. “Iran would make a preemptive strike,” he tells Soviet representatives in the lead up the story’s war, at secret meeting in Switzerland. “Not just against Iraq. We would simultaneously neutralize Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, as well as the northern tip of Oman. We will have the entire Persian Gulf – both sides – in our hands before the Americans even find out. After that they, and their friends the Saudis, will be finished in the Middle East […] provided your country does not intervene.” (Paul Erdman, “The Oil War of 1976: How the Shah Won the World“, New York Magazine, December 2, 1974. p. 43). In the story, the Shah sought to placate Soviet objections over invading Iraq by arguing that Tehran is a better ally to Moscow than Baghdad since it gets large amounts of natural gas from the regional power. He even offers Moscow one or two of his F-14s to examine.

Erdman’s war scenario ultimately lasts two days, he calls it the “Two Day War”, and results in a rapid defeat of the Iraqi military, prompting Baghdad to surrender. Iran uses its air power to devastating affect like Israel in the Six-Day War. Erdman goes so far as to write that it exceeded “even Israeli performance a few years back in terms of turnaround time and operational techniques.” Ironically, Saddam opened his real life preemptive attack invasion of Iran on September 22, 1980 by trying to replicate Israel’s tactics but failed to afflict any serious damage to the Iranian air force thanks to Tehran’s construction of hardened aircraft shelters to prevent its air force suffering the same faith as Egypt’s on June 5, 1967. The Shah’s takeover of the entire region concludes with the Americans second-guessing if he has nuclear weapons or not and realizing it was too costly to push him back. The Shah insists he remains a friend of the United States. Another oil price ensues as a result of the Iran’s aggression resulting in a 1929-esque financial crash, that bankrupts Britain and Italy, causes a famine and a collapse of Western societies in, ironically, 1979 “and ultimately, the end of the Industrial Era”.

In the real world 1976 intelligence reports suggested the Shah could seize Saudi Arabia if he wanted to, something they feared he might try and do were his oil reserves, then estimated to only last only another two decades, become depleted. While the Shah at that time, thanks to the Nixon Doctrine, was the predominate military force in, and “protector” of, the Gulf – especially since the British withdrawal in 1971 – the Gulf monarchies were “beginning to wonder who will protect them from their protector” (Jack Anderson, “Shah could take the Saudi fields”, Syndicated column, March 26, 1976).

As a result of the Algiers Accords of the previous year, Iran and Iraq were technically at peace at that time. Analysts believed this peace would be shattered were the Shah to invade Saudi Arabia, predicting that Iraq would then have broken its agreement with Tehran to side with the Saudis, potentially sparking a major regional war in which “from a great distance, Egypt and Jordan would also be expected to back Saudi Arabia.” (Anderson, 1976)

CBS host Mike Wallace quoted to the Shah from a CIA psychological profile which mentioned the prediction that he might invade regional oilfields. The Shah initially denied knowledge of the report before outright dismissing it. “I think there is lots of imagination in that,” he casually remarked (see video below).

Ultimately, noted author Thomas A. Petrie in retrospect, what Erdman “and much of the rest of the world did not know was that by 1978, the Shah would become terminally ill, and thus, he would be the initiator of the next disruption by virtue of his absence (or more correctly, his abdication) rather than by his overwhelming military presence.” (Thomas A. Petrie, “Following Oil: Four Decades of Cycle-Testing Experiences and What They Foretell about U.S. Energy Independence”, University of Oklahoma Press, July 2015, p. 40).

Posted in Armed Forces, English, History, Iran, Paul Iddon | Tagged , , , | 4 Comments

A Gate Unguarded: The ISIS Threat in Tajikistan

by Paul Pryce. With degrees in political science from both sides of the pond, Paul Pryce has previously worked as Senior Research Fellow for the Atlantic Council of Canada’s Canadian Armed Forces program, as a Research Fellow for the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, and as an Associate Fellow at the Latvian Institute of International Affairs. He has also served as an infantryman in the Canadian Forces.

An image taken from a video distributed by ISIS on July 31, 2018 purportedly shows the militants who the terror group claims attacked a group of international cyclists in Tajikistan on July 29.

An image taken from a video distributed by ISIS on July 31, 2018 purportedly shows the militants who the terror group claims attacked a group of international cyclists in Tajikistan on July 29.

On 29 July 2018, Tajikistan experienced its worst terrorist attack in the 17 years since it gained independence from the Soviet Union. In that attack, five militants, who had sworn allegiance in a video to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), struck a group of international cyclists with a car and then proceeded to stab the survivors with knives, before local police arrived on the scene, killing four of the militants and arresting one. As a result of the attack, two Americans, one Swiss citizen, and one Dutch citizen were killed, while three others – one Swiss, one Dutch, and one French – were injured. The attack was carried out in Danghara District, near the hometown of Emomali Rahmon, who has been President of Tajikistan since 1992.

Whether the location was important to the planners of the attack is not known, though the authorities have been quick to blame the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) for this targeting of tourists, portraying it as an effort to undermine President Rahmon’s international credibility. The IRPT was one of the parties which formed the United Tajik Opposition during the Tajik Civil War, a conflict waged between 1992 and 1997 amid regional and ethnic rivalries and in protest against the perceived authoritarianism of President Rahmon. The conflict resulted in the deaths of 25,000 to 100,000 people, mainly from Tajikistan but also Taliban fighters from neighbouring Afghanistan, before peace talks in Moscow led to the cessation of hostilities and the legalization of the IRPT, which soon came to be the second largest political party in the country. The IRPT continued to participate in Tajikistan’s democratic process until, amid a campaign of harassment from the authorities, the party was abruptly banned in 2015 from all future elections and was designated as a terrorist organization.

In this context, it is doubtful that the IRPT was somehow involved in the attack and so the claim of responsibility by ISIS should be accepted as the most plausible explanation for the targeting of these cyclists. This presents some concerns for the integrity of the Tajik state, as the Afghan affiliate of ISIS, which refers to itself as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – Khorasan Province (ISIS-KP), has come under increased pressure from both the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and the Taliban. A rash of bombings and other attacks across northern Afghanistan indicate that ISIS-KP is worried about potential peace talks amid the other Afghan factions and the resulting isolation this would create for the terrorist organization. Were ISIS to find itself locked out of a political solution to the more than 17-year conflict in Afghanistan, its few thousand fighters could be displaced to Tajikistan, from where it could launch further attacks or attempt to seize power in that country.

The attack on July 30th demonstrates how ill-prepared Tajikistan is to combat ISIS. The Tajik National Army is poorly trained and equipped, comprised largely of former militias that fought on both sides of the 1992-1997 Civil War. United States National Guard units, particularly from Virginia, have conducted joint training exercises with the Tajik National Army for several years in an effort to develop a competent roster of non-commissioned officers in Tajikistan, but this is an endeavour which will take many more years to reach fruition, as command structures in the Tajik military remain highly centralized. Furthermore, Tajikistan’s Border Service is poorly equipped and rife with corruption, as documented by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), allowing for the trafficking of substantial quantities of narcotics and firearms across the border with Afghanistan. A concerted effort by ISIS fighters to infiltrate Tajikistan would clearly not encounter much resistance.

A Soldier from the 183rd Regiment, 1st Battalion, Virginia National Guard instructs Tajik service members about self-aid buddy care procedures during a field training exercise part of multinational exercise Regional Cooperation 2017, July 17, 2017, in Fakhrabad, Tajikistan. Hosted by Tajikistan's Ministry of Defense, RC 17 affords participants the opportunity to exercise a United Nations directive to focus counterterrorism, border security and peacekeeping operations (Photo: Staff Sgt. Michael Battles / U.S. Air Force).

A Soldier from the 183rd Regiment, 1st Battalion, Virginia National Guard instructs Tajik service members about self-aid buddy care procedures during a field training exercise part of multinational exercise Regional Cooperation 2017, July 17, 2017, in Fakhrabad, Tajikistan. Hosted by Tajikistan’s Ministry of Defense, RC 17 affords participants the opportunity to exercise a United Nations directive to focus counterterrorism, border security and peacekeeping operations (Photo: Staff Sgt. Michael Battles / U.S. Air Force).

Neighbouring countries, however, appear keenly aware of Tajikistan’s fragility. In October, Tajikistan will play host to joint exercises by rapid reaction forces from the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, organized under the auspices of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) approximately 15 kilometres from the Tajik-Afghan border. Two weeks prior to the aforementioned ISIS attack, Russian and Tajik troops also held exercises explicitly intended to help prepare Tajikistan for the detection and interdiction of militants attempting to cross into the country from Afghanistan. China, however, has been largely missing from the effort to develop Tajik capabilities. In October 2016, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) held large-scale counter-terrorism exercises with the Tajik National Army, involving more than 10,000 troops from the two sides, near the border with Afghanistan. But China seems unwilling, or unable, to assist in the sustained work of developing a modern, professional military force to defend Tajikistan.

OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe supports advanced explosive ordnance disposal courses.  Tajik Officer filling in explosive ordnance disposal operation briefing board, Lyaur, Tajikistan, 19 July 2017 (Photo: Nozim Kalandarov / OSCE).

OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe supports advanced explosive ordnance disposal courses. Tajik Officer filling in explosive ordnance disposal operation briefing board, Lyaur, Tajikistan, 19 July 2017 (Photo: Nozim Kalandarov / OSCE).

This is surprising as China shares a 414-kilometre border with the Central Asian state, and the collapse of state institutions in Tajikistan would inevitably have a destabilizing effect on China’s Xinjiang province. The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which seeks to establish an independent Islamic state concentrated on Xinjiang, would have greater maneuverability in its operations were it to find sanctuary in a Tajik state governed by a like-minded party, though it might not find much in terms of shared resources with ISIS-KP, given that ETIM’s focus would be on Tajikistan’s eastern border with China while ISIS-KP would remain concentrated on the southern border with Afghanistan. But there is certainly a precedent for such a “live and let live” partnership, such as the Taliban’s decision to host and offer sanctuary in Afghanistan to al-Qaeda in the mid-1990s.

China’s relative lack of engagement in Tajikistan may simply be due to suspicion of President Rahmon’s strategic intentions. In 2011, Tajikistan ratified a deal, originally negotiated in 1999, which ceded 1,000 square kilometres of territory in the Pamir mountain range to China and demarcated much of the border. With a competently trained and well-equipped military, perhaps China worries, President Rahmon could just as well attempt to reclaim this ceded territory and fuel instability in nearby Xinjiang as he could combat ISIS and drug traffickers. The Chinese leadership may have assessed the current situation and determined that the least risk would be in allowing other regional partners to bolster Tajikistan’s security and then only intervene militarily if ISIS-KP does in fact establish sufficient presence to formally seize Tajik territory.

Regardless, the brazen attack on foreign tourists in Danghara is a worrying development in a volatile region. More will need to be done by the international community to ensure that the ISIS threat is contained as that group seeks purchase elsewhere.

Posted in Armed Forces, English, International, Paul Pryce, Security Policy, Tajikistan, Terrorism | Tagged , | 1 Comment

An U.S.-American point of view: Europe must regrow its teeth!

by Lt. Col. Chad M. Pillai. He is is a military strategist who has served in assignments in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. Lt. Col. Pillai was assigned to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from 2012-2013 where he worked on U.S. and NATO policy. He is a published author in a variety of journals and received his Master of International Public Policy (MIPP) degree from the Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). The opinion in this article reflect the author’s personal views and do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government.

Europe is confronted with a United States that is tired and frustrated as seen by the recent NATO Summit that exposed this frustration when the president of the United States confronted NATO allies, especially Germany to spend more on their defense. The world’s sole Superpower is tired of the responsibility of managing the “Liberal Empire” built on the notions of democracy and free-trade since World War II.

After decades of asking Europe to spend more on its security and to uphold the NATO Alliance’s pledge of 2% of the gross domestic product (GDP), the United States is letting its rage show to the discomfort of the European nations for failing to meet their commitment. Germany was singled out because of its strong economy and its large population in comparison to the rest of Europe.

While the United States spends close to 4% of its GDP on defense that figured its spread across the world to support alliances in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. As Europe and the United States face growing competition and threats from Russia, China, and rogue nations such as Iran and North Korea along with transnational terrorism, it is time for Europe to grow its teeth again.

While the European Union as an integrated economic union is rich, it remains militarily impotent compared to its latent potential. In fact, as George Friedman, author of the book “Flashpoints: The Emerging Crisis in Europe” wrote, “Hannah Arendt, a postwar philosopher, once said that the most dangerous thing in the world is to be rich and weak. Wealth can only be protected by strength, as unlike the poor, the wealthy are envied and have things others want, and unlike the strong they are subject to power.” (Friedman, Flashpoints, p. 157).

While Europe remains scarred by the catastrophic period of war between 1914-1945 where over a 100 million perished, the period after World War I and II under the protective umbrella of U.S. military might have given Europe the space needed to rebuild. This allowed European nations to rebuild their societies and economies, and eventually worked towards the project of European integration that hadn’t truly existed since the Holy Roman Empire brought some form of resemblance to the former Greco-Roman world. After the end of the Cold War, the Europeans sped ahead with integration of their economies while cashing in their “peace dividend” by dramatically reducing their military capability.

The fractures between the United States and Europe materialized in the 1990s during the Balkan conflicts of Bosnia and Kosovo, where the European nations, the European Union as a collective body, failed to stop a bloody conflict in its backyard until it became a NATO operation when the United States took lead to end the bloodshed.

The European Union proposed the European Security and Defense Policy as an alternative security force to NATO (meaning when the U.S. and Canada were not involved) when it was not needed to lead an operation. While it has evolved since 1998, it never grew into an actual military force capable of deterring aggression from the likes of Russia. As Friedman points out regarding the Russian intervention in Georgia in 2008, “[w]hen…no one came to Georgia’s aid, a founding premise of the European Unification – that the European Union would take care of the economy while NATO would take care of security – became more uncertain.” (Friedman, Flashpoints, p. 119).

The mightiest military alliance in history is only 11 weeks into an operation against a poorly armed regime in a sparsely populated country. Yet many allies are beginning to run short of munitions, requiring the US, once more, to make up the difference. — U.S. defence secretary Robert Gates cited in Ian Traynor, “US Defence Chief Blasts Europe over Nato“, The Guardian, 10.06.2011.

In 2011, this weakness was displayed again during the intervention in Libya, where elements that constituted the core of NATO and the EU force, primarily the British and French, relied heavily on U.S enabler support.

The Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014 with irregular forces and then annexation further demonstrated the EU’s and by default NATO’s impotence. The European Union could not muster a significant military force to deter conventional Russian aggression and Russia presents an uncomfortable reality as Friedman once again points out that “[t]he problem of the EU was that the Europeans had nothing to offer but peace and prosperity – an Ode to Joy. But what would happen if the joy failed, if either peace or prosperity evaporated? Then what would hold men together in brotherhood, and what would hold the European Union together?” (Friedman, Flashpoints, p. 119).

Some would counter argue by rightly pointing out that neither Georgia nor Ukraine is a NATO member. Therefore, there was no justification for the NATO alliance to invoke an Article 5 response. At the same time, NATO has stepped up its military presence in eastern Europe to include its Air Policing Mission over the Baltics, and forward stationed troops ranging in eastern Europe, and establishing a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VHJTF) to respond to Russian aggression. These steps are designed to serve as both a tripwire and as means to initially inflict punishment on any Russian aggression; however, RAND war games conducted between the summer of 2014 and spring 2015 highlighted NATO’s vulnerabilities to stop a full-scale Russian ground assault near the Baltics in large part due to NATO’s inability to project sufficient power from western Europe as major seaports, airports, road and rail networks would be targeted by Russian advanced systems such the Iskandar missile and NATO airpower would be under threat from Russian S-300/S-400 air defense systems (see also Patrick Truffer, “Zapad 2017 demonstrates the modernisation of the Russian armed forces“, offiziere.ch, 16.02.2018). Right now, the European Union, and NATO with U.S. assistance can provide some deterrence against Russian aggression; but without the U.S., the EU and NATO do not have a credible conventional military force capable of defending its interests against Russia without risking nuclear escalation (the UK and France maintain a small yet credible nuclear deterrence to Russian adventurism).

Despite the European Union total population exceeding that of the United States, the current force structure of various European allies is appalling compared to the U.S. When comparing forces in the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Military Balance 2018, one sees that the U.S. Marine Corps with its three active divisions and three active air wings is larger than the entire British Military establishment. The U.S. Special Operations Command total force structure is about equal – and if further UK cuts are made – will be larger than the entire British Army. The once vaunted Royal Navy has less personal than the U.S. Coast Guard. However, the British do field very capable forces, especially its Special Forces, that continue to serve alongside the United States in various conflicts in the Middle East and Afghanistan.

As the chart above illustrates, NATO without the U.S. spends only about one-third of the U.S. defense spending. For comparison: Russia’s small military spending is almost five times lesser than the one of NATO without the U.S. If NATO without the U.S. were to meet its 2% pledge, it would equal roughly 50% of the U.S. defense expenditures and would not reach parity until it would reach 4% of GDP.

Increased spending will not solve all of NATO’s problems. NATO’s spending must address the gaps in operational capability, material stocks, transportation networks (air, sea, road, and rail networks sufficiently hardened and standardized), etc. Germany has recently been the target of criticism when stories leaked that only a small portion of its Eurofighters are operational, significant problems with its naval assets, and army helicopter pilots have to train on civilian ones because of chronic maintenance issues (George Allison, “Less than a Third of German Military Assets Are Operational Says Report“, UK Defence Journal, 21.06.2018). If the Europeans want the United States, and by extension Russia, to take them seriously, they need to rectify their chronic military shortfalls.

To effectively deter Russian aggression, considering Russia’s formidable A2/AD systems that could challenge the rapid introduction of U.S. forces, European forces need to have the capability to deter and at a minimum buy time for U.S. reinforcements to arrive (and more than likely will have to fight their way from western Europe again if key air and sea ports are disrupted in eastern Europe). If the U.S. walks away into isolation, all that free education and healthcare in Europe will not defend them from others who are more powerful (a U.S. critique without the proper context since Europeans pay for those benefits with higher taxation).

In addition to military shortfalls in Europe, Europe states need to reduce or eliminate the caveats they place on their forces when deployed to operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere. The joke that the acronym for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan really meant “I Saw Americans Fight” was partly due to the maddening frustration with caveats from nations on if and when their militaries would conduct actual combat operations. Of course, some were better than others, but after watching the torturous process of getting force commitments from European partners for ISAF, it became clear that things needed to change. Again, it should not be a struggle to get combat ready brigades (plural for a reason since one brigade is about 3-5,000 Soldiers) from a nation(s) whose population is more than 60 million.

The relationship between the United States and Europe is not only challenged by the current Russian threat, but in the long-term will be increasingly challenged by China’s global ambitions. The growing Chinese influence as a result of its “One Belt and One Road” (OBOR) initiative along the routes of the famed “Silk and Spice Road” traveled by Marco Polo, the geography that separated Europe from Asia continues to shrink while the challenges increase. This astute observation is made by famed geopolitical analyst Robert D. Kaplan in his recent book, when he wrote:

As Europe disappears, Eurasia coheres. I do not mean to say that Eurasia is becoming unified, or even stable in the manner that Europe was during the Cold War and the Post Cold War — only that the interactions of globalization, technology, and geopolitics, with each reinforcing the other, are leading the Eurasian supercontinent to be come analytically speaking, one fluid and comprehensible unit. Eurasian simply has meaning in a way that it didn’t used to. Morever, because of the reunification of the Mediterranean Basin, evinced by refugees from North Africa and the Levant flooding Europe, and because of dramatically increased interactions across the Indian Ocean from Indochina to East Africa, we may not speak of Afro-Eurasia in one breath. The term “World Island,” early-twentieth-century British geographer Halford Mackinder’s phrase Eurasia jointed with Africa, is no longer premature. — Robert D. Kaplan, “The Return of Marco Polo’s World: War, Strategy, and American Interests in the Twenty-First Century“, Random House, 2018, p. 7.

In light of these challenges, Europe must regrow its teeth – actual military capability to match its economic status. If it wants to be taken seriously by competitors and threats ranging from Russia, China, and/or Iran, it needs to demonstrate it has the capability to back its “soft power” with credible “hard power”. Finally, if Europe wants to regain the respect and trust of a frustrated U.S.-America, it must prove it has the means to be an equal partner. The famous quote by Winston Churchill: “There is at least one thing worse than fighting with allies – and that is to fight without them” still applies. However, the current situation lies somewhere in the middle where the United States is frustrated with its allies who lack the capacity to fight alongside it – a worrying reality if the United States finds itself in a major conflict with a near-peer competitor such as Russia and/or China. Europe needs to recall its martial ghost of Sparta, Alexander, Rome, and Charlemagne once again if it wants to be taken seriously upon a growing multipolar world.

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Note (August 9, 2018): This is a revised version of the original article. Due to a mistake in the transmission of the final draft, the original article had several grammatical errors. We apologize for the inconveniences.

Posted in Armed Forces, Chad M. Pillai, English, International, Security Policy | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , | 7 Comments

Chemical Weapons in Syria: Red Lines or Proving Grounds

Despite the fact that they are banned, chemical weapons are still being used today. According to a French analysis, chemical weapons were used in at least 130 instances in Syria between October 2012 and April 2017 (Rebecca Hersman, “Resisting Impunity for Chemical-Weapons Attacks“, Survival 60, no. 2, p. 75). The two U.S. presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump have reacted differently to major chemical weapons attacks in Syria. One made threats, did not consistently implement the threats and therefore lost his credibility; the other seized the opportunity, did not hesitate to take action, and used his “nice, new and smart” missiles. Neither of the presidents made an impression on the Syrian ruler Bashar al-Assad.

Syrian medical staff take part in a training exercise to learn how to treat victims of chemical weapons attacks, in a course organized by the World Health Organisation in Gaziantep, Turkey (Photo: Murad Sezer).

Syrian medical staff take part in a training exercise to learn how to treat victims of chemical weapons attacks, in a course organized by the World Health Organisation in Gaziantep, Turkey (Photo: Murad Sezer).

Back at the beginning of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, it was well known in intelligence circles that Syria had one of the largest active chemical weapons programmes in the world. The Syrian Armed Forces had several hundred tonnes of mustard gas (a blister agent), as well as several hundred tonnes of the nerve agent Sarin and several dozen tonnes of VX (another nerve agent). These chemical warfare agents could be deployed using aircraft bombs, artillery grenades or missiles (République Française, “Synthèse nationale de renseignement déclassifié: Programme chimique syrien, cas d’emploi passés d’agents chimiques par le régime et l’attaque chimique conduite par le régime le 21 août 2013“, 02.09.2013, p. 3). It was the first time in a civil war in which one party to the conflict had such a large arsenal of chemical weapons. In this context, two main scenarios gave cause for concern: the use of chemical warfare agents by the Assad regime, especially in the event of its imminent collapse, and the proliferation by extremist groups (Mary Beth D Nikitin, Paul K Kerr, and Andrew Feickert, “Syria’s Chemical Weapons: Issues for Congress“, Congressional Research Service, 30.09.2013.).

The situation got worse at the end of July 2012, when Damascus threatened to use chemical weapons in the event of an “external aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic“. In response to a question posed by the journalist Chuck Todd, U.S. President Barack Obama confirmed during a press briefing in August 2012 that he did not intend to begin a military intervention in Syria, but that a movement or the use of large quantities of chemical weapons could change this, and far-reaching consequences would follow. The use or proliferation of chemical weapons was not only concerning for the USA: it was also worrying for their allies in the Middle East.

We have been very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized. […] We have communicated in no uncertain terms with every player in the region that that’s a red line for us and that there would be enormous consequences if we start seeing movement on the chemical weapons front or the use of chemical weapons. That would change my calculations significantly. — Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President to the White House Press Corps“, 20.08.2012.

Obama repeated this again in December 2012 when he addressed his threat of far-reaching consequences directly to Assad: “The use of chemical weapons is, and would be, totally unacceptable and if you make the tragic mistake of using these weapons, there will be consequences and you will be held accountable.” By August 2013, this “red line” had been confirmed several times by the U.S. government.

Obama had been rather naive in his hope of intimidating Assad and offering a deterrent against the use and proliferation of chemical weapons to non-governmental groups, such as Hezbollah [1]. As far as the use of chemical weapons was concerned, Obama’s threats were in vain. The Syrian Armed Forces most likely deployed sarin on 19 March 2013 in Khan al-Asal (20 dead, 124 injured), 29 April 2013 in Saraqueb (1 dead, 10 injured) and on 21 August 2013 in Ghouta (355 dead, 3,600 injured) [2].

The attack on Ghouta could not be ignored by the U.S. government, especially because an early U.S. estimate was rather high, talking of over 1,400 dead (of which 426 were children). About a week after the attack, the U.S. government announced that it had solid evidence that the Syrian government had carried out the chemical weapons attack (Jeffrey Lewis and Bruno Tertrais, “The Thick Red Line: Implications of the 2013 Chemical-Weapons Crisis for Deterrence and Transatlantic Relations“, Survival 59, no. 6, p. 85). The “red line” drawn by Obama around a year earlier had therefore apparently been clearly crossed, in anyone’s view. However, Obama was hesitant to implement the threatened consequences — the massive military attack by the U.S. Armed Forces which was anticipated never took place.

In the hope of intimidating Assad and by drawing the “red line”, Obama had backed himself into a corner because the unilateral use of military force without the approval of the UN Security Council was utterly contrary to his fundamental convictions. When the British parliament rejected a motion by British Prime Minister David Cameron at the end of August 2013, which had been intended to pave the way for British military involvement to punish the Assad regime, Obama’s concerns about falling into a trap by unilaterally taking military action were particularly pressing (Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine“, The Atlantic, April 2016). At the same time, this also opened up new scope for Obama: new, the U.S. Congress should decide about military retaliation in Syria. The corresponding bill was introduced to the U.S. Senate on 6 September 2013.

In a formal sense, the U.S. President, as commander-in-chief of the U.S. Armed Forces, would not have required the approval of Congress to take such a limited action (Barack Obama, “Text of President Obama’s Remarks on Syria”, The New York Times, 31.08.2013). With the involvement of Congress, however, Obama was not only playing for time (and as time passed military retaliation became less likely): he was also able to shift responsibility to Congress, while at the same time taking himself out of the line of fire (Lewis and Tertrais, p. 79). As early as 4 September 2013, he qualified his statements about the “red line”. He defined and clearly showed whose credibility was at stake: “I didn’t set a red line. The world set a red line. […] My credibility is not on the line. The international community’s credibility is on the line, and America and Congress’s credibility’s on the line.” (Jonathan Allen, “Obama Reframes ‘Red Line’ Rhetoric“, Politico, 04.09.2013).

But before the bill made it to the U.S. House of Representatives, the situation changed: on 9 September 2013, the then Foreign Minister John Kerry answered questions from journalists during a visit to Great Britain. Asked by journalist Margaret Brennan what the Assad regime could do to avert a U.S. military strike, Kerry replied:

[Bashar al-Assad] could turn over every single bit of his chemical weapons to the international community in the next week. Turn it over, all of it, without delay, and allow a full and total accounting for that. But he isn’t about to do it, and it can’t be done, obviously. — John Kerry, “Press Conference by Kerry, British Foreign Secretary Hague“, U.S. Departement of State, 19.12.2013.

This was not a well-thought out strategy, but a slip by Kerry, which incorrectly spread over the media as an U.S. ultimatum to Assad. This assessment is also underscored by a U.S. State Department statement that Kerry’s remark was merely rhetorical in nature.

Just a few hours later, with the agreement of Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov proposed the seizure and destruction of all Syrian chemical weapons, which led to the “Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons” on 14 September 2013 (Julian Borger and Patrick Wintour, “Russia Calls on Syria to Hand over Chemical Weapons“, The Guardian, 09.09.2013). With its swift implementation and Syria’s immediate accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention, U.S. retaliation was definitely off the table. From a humanitarian point of view, this was an ideal solution which, by destroying (a large proportion) of Syrian chemical weapons, may have prevented things from becoming worse and effectively saved human lives. But even this was not enough for Assad to stop himself from using chemical weapons again.

However, Obama’s publicly flaunted inconsistent behaviour was fatal for the credibility of the USA and its influence in the Middle East. Finally dropped by the West, this sealed the fate of the “moderate rebels” in Syria and strengthened radical Islamist groups. In the medium term, the USA lost their influence in the Middle East to Russia. Russia was not only able to expand its armaments business in the Middle East: since then they have again been regarded as an influential player in this region. On the international stage, the impression spread that the USA was no longer prepared to intervene decisively on a military level when fundamental international norms were breached. This gave Russia additional room for manoeuvre, which Putin skilfully exploited in the annexation of Crimea, the war in Ukraine in March/April 2014 and the Russian military operation in Syria from the end of September 2015 onwards (Lewis and Tertrais, p. 96f).

Screenshot from a video posted to YouTube on April 11, 2014 shows substantial yellow coloration at base of the cloud over Keferzita, Syria, drifting with main cloud, and color intensity appears to quickly dissipate over next 20 seconds.

Screenshot from a video posted to YouTube on April 11, 2014 shows substantial yellow coloration at base of the cloud over Keferzita, Syria, drifting with main cloud, and color intensity appears to quickly dissipate over next 20 seconds.

Officially, the chemical weapons declared by the Syrian government were destroyed at the beginning of January 2016. However, it is questionable as to whether all chemical weapons had been declared. Although Sarin attacks stopped from autumn 2013 until spring 2017, chlorine was used as a weapon in several cases from April 2014 onwards (“Fifth Report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons – United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism“, UN Security Council, 13.02.2017). Although chlorine stocks do not have to be declared, their use as a weapon is contrary to the Chemical Weapons Convention. Finally, on 4 April 2017, the Syrian Armed Forces deployed Sarin again in the attack on Khan Shaykhun (around 100 dead, 27 of which were children, and around 200 injured) (Hersman, p. 76; “Seventh Report of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons – United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism“, UN Security Council, 26.10.2017). It was the first such incident that had occurred during the term of U.S. President Donald Trump. As a power politician, it seemed clear to him that consequences had to follow in order to save the USA from further loss of face. On the morning of 7 April 2017 — just three days later — U.S. forces bombarded the Syrian-operated Shayrat Air Force base with 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles, with 58 Tomahawks destroying 44 targets on the air force base (“ISI First to Analyze Shayrat Airfield Missile Attack“, ImageSat International, 05.11.2017). The air strike enabled Trump to set an example, to show determination and strength, and to clearly set himself apart from Obama’s politics. Interestingly, the air strike occurred during the two-day visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Trump’s Mar-a-Lago, and could also be understood as a demonstration of power against China.

Trump’s bombardment of Syria’s Shayarat with 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles -- click on the image to enlarge (compiled by Louis Martin-Vézian of CIGeography).

Trump’s bombardment of Syria’s Shayarat with 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles — click on the image to enlarge (compiled by Louis Martin-Vézian of CIGeography (Facebook / Twitter).

Russia was informed in advance of the imminent air strike, which enabled the Syrian Armed Forces to bring some of their aircraft to safety. Although Shayrat is the second largest Syrian air force base, the U.S. air strike had no strategic consequences. Around 10 Syrian aircraft were destroyed, which were presumably mostly defective planes. In addition, 13 toughened aircraft protection structures, 10 weapon depots, 7 fuel tanks, 5 workshops and parts of 5 SA-6 anti-aircraft missile batteries were destroyed. Shayrat was defined as a target because it was from here that the chemical weapons attack on Khan Shaykhun took place. Nevertheless, no installations were destroyed that would have prevented a new chemical weapons attack from the air force base. According to National Security Advisor Herbert Raymond McMaster, the Sarin storage areas still on the air force base were deliberately not fired upon by Tomahawks to avoid the risk of poisoning civilians near the air force base (“Why Was Syria’s Shayrat Airbase Bombed?“, BBC News, 07.04.2017). The runway also remained intact, enabling the Syrian Armed Forces to land and take off from the base with their remaining Su-22s hours later.

Striking Syrian military bases is little punishment for the perpetrators, nor much justice or restitution for the victims. — Rebecca Hersman, p. 79.

The U.S. retaliation was basically ineffective as a deterrent. A good year later, the Syrian Armed Forces used chemical weapons in Douma (probably chlorine possibly in combination with Sarin, with 43 dead) (“Russia, Syria Trying To ‘Sanitize’ Chemical Attack Site, U.S. Says“, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 19.04.2018). This time, the US, together with France and Great Britain (hereinafter referred to as the “coalition”) bombed the Barzah scientific research centre, along with the Him Shinshar chemical weapons depot and its bunker with 105 cruise missiles. In order to exclude Russian victims, Russia was once again warned of this attack. According to the coalition, chemical weapons were being developed and manufactured in Barzah, but it seems unclear whether chemical weapons were also neutralised during the destruction of the three targets. Satellite photos showing the fire brigade in the immediate vicinity of the Barzah scientific research centre shortly after the air strike, and the absence of victims caused by the agents released make this rather doubtful, however.

Imagery taken on April 14, 2018 shortly after the destruction of the Barzah scientific research centre by 76 missiles shows two fire engines -- click on the image to enlarge.

Imagery taken on April 14, 2018 shortly after the destruction of the Barzah scientific research centre by 76 missiles shows two fire engines — click on the image to enlarge.

For the coalition, the air strikes were not only a retaliatory action: they also provided the opportunity to test the capabilities of their cruise missiles. For the first time, France used its sea-based version (Missile de Croisière Naval; MdCN) of the French variant (SCALP) of the British Storm Shadow. Apparently, however, the operation did not go quite to plan: three MdCNs did not even leave their launchers, and it would appear that the three which were fired missed their targets by several hundred metres (Jean-Dominique Merchet, “La Marine a rencontré des ‘aléas technique’ lors du tir des missiles de croisière“, L’Opinion, 17.04.2018). There are different reports about the number of cruise missiles which hit their targets. According to the coalition, all 105 cruise missiles that were fired reached the targets set. According to the opposition-friendly Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, however, at least 65 cruise missiles were intercepted by the Syrian air defence. Ultimately, this only plays a subordinate role: it was much more important for the coalition to send out a signal that the consequences threatened regarding the “red lines” which had been drawn, and their breaching of these lines, would be put into action. It will also be clear to the coalition that this has barely helped the population threatened by chemical weapons, because Assad can hardly be prevented from using chemical weapons again (especially chlorine) if his personal cost-benefit calculation clearly speaks in favour of such an operation (“Assessing the Impact of the U.S.-Led Strike on Syria“, Stratfor, 16.04.2018; Phil McCausland and Yuliya Talmazan, “Trump’s U.S.-Led Airstrike Won’t Stop Assad’s Chemical Capabilities, Experts Say“, NBC News, 16.04.2018).

Imagery taken on April 14, 2018 shortly after the destruction of the Shinshar chemical weapons storage by 22 missiles -- click on the image to enlarge.

Imagery taken on April 14, 2018 shortly after the destruction of the Shinshar chemical weapons storage by 22 missiles — click on the image to enlarge.

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Graphic compiled by Louis Martin-Vézian of CIGeography (Facebook / Twitter).

• • •

Footnotes
[1] According to a spokesman for the Syrian Foreign Ministry, the authority to decide on the use of chemical weapons lies with the generals of the Syrian Armed Forces. According to U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, however, the command authority for the use of chemical weapons is in the hands of Bashar al-Assad, his brother Maher al-Assad and an unnamed general in the Syrian Armed Forces.
[2]Chemical weapons used in Syria appear to come from army stockpile“, Reuters, 05.03.2014; Gwyn Winfield, “Ake Sellstrom, Chief UN weapons inspector in Syria, tells Gwyn Winfield about the challenges of doing a CWA inspection in the twenty-first century“, CBRNe World, February 2014, p. 10; Sellström Åke, “United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic“, 12.12.2013.

Posted in English, Proliferation, Security Policy, Syria | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

RIMPAC 2018: Who’s In and Who’s Out?

by Paul Pryce. With degrees in political science from both sides of the pond, Paul Pryce has previously worked as Senior Research Fellow for the Atlantic Council of Canada’s Canadian Armed Forces program, as a Research Fellow for the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, and as an Associate Fellow at the Latvian Institute of International Affairs. He has also served as an infantryman in the Canadian Forces.

The Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) is one of the world’s largest military exercises, held biannually by the United States Navy (USN) since 1971 in its Hawaiian and southern Californian training areas, usually with participation from several Pacific partner countries. On June 27th, the latest edition was underway and the exercise is expected to end today, on August 2nd, 2018. With more than 50 naval vessels deployed this year, RIMPAC 2018 is one of the largest and most ambitious yet in this long-standing series of exercises.

There are some notable changes from previous editions of RIMPAC, however. As reported widely in the media, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) was “disinvited” due to China’s “continued militarization of the South China Sea“. This follows participation by Chinese naval assets in the 2014 and 2016 editions of RIMPAC, which was seen to some extent as an effective means of building trust and confidence between the USN, PLAN, and regional navies. However, it is worthwhile noting that Chinese deployments were relatively limited, with the contribution in 2016 consisting of one Luyang II-class destroyer, one Jiangkai II-class frigate, one Qiandaohu-class replenishment ship, one Type-926 submarine support ship, and the Peace Ark hospital ship. The Chinese contribution to RIMPAC 2014 was also joined by a Type 815 Dongdiao-class intelligence collection vessel, which was not invited to participate but nonetheless proceeded to monitor signals and other communications from RIMPAC participants while remaining near the island of Oahu. With progress stalled on a South China Sea Code of Conduct, though, there are some understandable doubts as to whether Chinese inclusion in RIMPAC was having any effect on China’s political leadership and their willingness to employ military force in support of territorial expansion.

Republic of Indonesia Navy guided-missile frigate KRI Martadinata participates in RIMPAC 2018 (Photo: Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Arthurgwain L. Marquez)

Republic of Indonesia Navy guided-missile frigate KRI Martadinata participates in RIMPAC 2018 (Photo: Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Arthurgwain L. Marquez).

Just as importantly, however, the Indonesian Navy has expanded its involvement, deploying its new Dutch-designed Martadinata-class frigate, KRI Raden Eddy Martadinata, as well as the landing platform dock KRI Makassar. Commissioned in 2017, the Martadinata-class frigate joining the exercise is a milestone for Indonesia’s campaign to modernize and expand its maritime forces in response to increased illegal fishing from Chinese vessels in or near Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone. Meanwhile, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, and Israel joined RIMPAC for the first time, although the Israeli Navy and the Vietnam People’s Navy contributed only staff officers to the exercise. The deployment of several Vietnamese naval vessels to a future edition of RIMPAC will be crucial to U.S. alliance-building efforts in the Asia-Pacific region. Interestingly, regarding the Sri Lankan contribution, the force was comprised of 19 members of the Sri Lanka Navy’s marine battalion, who received training from the United States Marine Corps (USMC) during RIMPAC, continuing a relationship between the two forces that began in 2016 with the original members of this Sri Lankan unit being trained largely by the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) of the USMC.

RIMPAC 2018 also heavily emphasized the multi-domain capabilities of the U.S. and its allies. A “Sinking Exercise” (SINKEX) held on July 12 saw U.S., Japanese, and Australian forces sink a decommissioned amphibious ship with air- and submarine-launched anti-ship cruise missiles, ground-launched cruise missiles, land-based artillery and rocket systems, and a submarine-launched torpedo. Of particular note, the hulk was hit with a Naval Strike Missile (NSM), a land-based anti-ship weapon jointly developed by the Norwegian company Kongsberg Defence and Aerospace (KDA) with a range of over 500 kilometres. Showcasing this weapon and others at the SINKEX may have been intended to demonstrate to China that it does not have the monopoly on Anti Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities. For example, China has touted its Dongfeng-21D anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) as a potential means to defend its territorial claims in the South China Sea, with several of these missiles stationed at a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) base in northern Guangdong province, leaving many contest islands within range. The DF-21D has a far greater range than the NSM, however, and so SINKEX also demonstrates the need for the U.S. and its allies to catch-up to China’s progress in asymmetric maritime warfare.

Live-fire from aircraft, a submarine, and land-based assets including High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (M142 HIMARS), and Type 12 Surface-to-Ship Missiles sink the decommissioned ex-USS Racine (LST-1191) July 12 off the coast of Hawaii.

In any case, RIMPAC 2018 (and the politics surrounding it) will be the subject of much discussion and analysis in the months to come. As the first such exercise to be held since the introduction of the “Indo-Pacific” concept by the Trump Administration, it has highlighted some of the challenges facing its implementation. On the one hand, disinviting China showed the US’ willingness to pursue this concept of Indo-Pacific security and take a harder position on China’s activities in the South China Sea. On the other hand, the Indian Navy’s deployment of a lone frigate, INS Sahyadri, might represent India’s scepticism about the concept or simply the Indian Navy’s lack of preparedness to undertake such sustained, long-range operations.

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The Future of Peace Talks with the Taliban

by Austin Michael Bodetti. He is an analyst and journalist specializing in Afghanistan and Iraq. He has a comedic email list about the Middle East that you can join here.

Taliban's political office is seen on June 19, 2013 in Doha, Qatar.

Taliban’s political office is seen on June 19, 2013 in Doha, Qatar.

Given that neither the Taliban nor the United States appears any closer to lasting victory in 2018 than in 2001, a consensus has emerged in the international community that a political settlement to the War in Afghanistan remains the only way to end it. Some U.S.-politicians and pundits have argued that the U.S. should withdraw from Afghanistan, others that it can defeat the Taliban once and for all by deploying more soldiers. Neither option, however, looks realistic. Unless the Taliban and the U.S. plan to stay at war forever, peace talks seem the only viable alternative if either side wants to effect some kind of change.

Despite the gradual consensus on the need for a political settlement to end the War in Afghanistan, the roadblocks to peace talks have only increased since the start of the conflict. The Taliban has more money and support now than ever before. The insurgents have grown more hostile to the Western world and the U.S. in particular, and their most anti-peace faction has a hold on the Quetta Shura, the Taliban’s waning leadership. None of these factors preclude peace talks on their own, but they represent obstacles that the U.S. must navigate if it hopes to bring the insurgents to the negotiating table and learn from past failures.

When the War in Afghanistan began, the U.S. missed an early opportunity to negotiate with the Taliban. In December 2001, Taliban leaders proposed surrendering in exchange for amnesty, but the Afghan government and the U.S. ignored their offer in anticipation of defeating the insurgents on the battlefield (Anand Gopal, No Good Men Among the Living: America, the Taliban, and the War through Afghan Eyes, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2014, p. 47). Some observers hypothesized that the Taliban only resorted to insurgency in the first place because the U.S. refused to negotiate with the insurgents once it had overthrown the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Anand Gopal, “The Taliban in Kandahar”, in Talibanistan: Negotiating the Borders between Terror, Politics, and Religion, ed. Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, Oxford University Press, 2013, 1f). After defeating the Taliban in a show of force, the U.S. enjoyed temporary leverage over its demoralized leaders. Seventeen years later, though, the superpower has found itself struggling to bring the insurgents to the negotiating table, a significant turn of events for a country used to influence and victory.

Former Taliban fighters at a jail complex in Shebargan, Afghanistan (Photo: Yuri Kozyrev).

Former Taliban fighters at a jail complex in Shebargan, Afghanistan (Photo: Yuri Kozyrev).

Once the U.S. had reevaluated its position on peace talks, it ran into the obstacle of determining how to initiate negotiations with Taliban leaders who had made their own reassessment about the benefits of peace. U.S. President George W. Bush’s foreign policy had emphasized fighting the Taliban, but U.S. President Barack Obama had campaigned on the goal of extricating U.S.-soldiers from Afghanistan. Afghan and U.S.-diplomats thus had to lean on their allies in the Persian Gulf to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table. In 2008, Saudi Arabia organized meetings between representatives of the Afghan government and the insurgents (Thomas Ruttig, “Negotiations with the Taliban”, in Talibanistan, p. 441). The U.S. would complain only a year later, however, that Saudi Arabia was doing too little to stop the insurgents from fundraising on its territory (Declan Walsh, “Wikileaks Cables Portray Saudi Arabia as a Cash Machine for Terrorists“, The Guardian, December 5, 2010). For its part, the United Arab Emirate funded a meeting between representatives of the Afghan government and the Taliban in Kabul in 2010 (Ruttig, p. 442). These conversations failed to prevent hiccups in the peace process: the same year, the Afghan government discovered that it was negotiating with an impostor who had introduced himself as Mullah Akhtar Mansour, then Mullah Muhammad Omar’s second in command (Dexter Filkins and Carlotta Gall, “Taliban Leader in Secret Talks Was an Imposto“, The New York Times, November 22, 2010). Some observers expected that the death of Osama bin Laden would bring the Taliban to the negotiating table, but those hopes too never came to fruition. The insurgents opened a diplomatic mission in Qatar for the purpose of peace talks in 2013 only for the Afghan government to complain that the Taliban was billing itself as a government in exile (Reza Sayah, “At Their Office in Doha, Taliban Make Changes“, CNN, June 20, 2013). It would take a prisoner swap to bring the insurgents and the U.S. from these frequent episodes of miscommunication into concrete, productive negotiations that might lay the groundwork for peace talks.

Discussions over the fate of Bowe Bergdahl, an U.S.-prisoner of war held by the Taliban for several years, forced the U.S. to negotiate with the Haqqani network, considered the most anti-peace Taliban faction. From Bergdahl’s 2009 capture to his 2014 release, the Haqqanis insisted on exchanging him for the “Taliban Five“, prominent insurgents incarcerated in Guantánamo Bay Naval Base. After five years of back and forth, the U.S. agreed to the Haqqanis’ initial conditions (“Negotiation Analysis: The US, Taliban, and the Bergdahl Exchange“, Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, December 5, 2017). U.S.-diplomats hoped that the release of the “Taliban Five” would act as a building block to peace talks, considering that the prisoner swap amounted to the most substantive negotiations with the Taliban in the history of the War in Afghanistan (Michael Semple, “Why Did the Negotiations to Free Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl Take Years?“, Interview by Marco Werman, Public Radio International, June 6, 2014). The U.S. had proved that it could negotiate with even the Haqqanis, the Taliban faction described as the most hostile to peace talks. If the U.S. could conduct a prisoner exchange with them, perhaps it could conclude a political settlement with all the insurgents.

The wreckage of a vehicle that Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour was said to be traveling in near the Afghan border in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan.

The wreckage of a vehicle that Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour was said to be traveling in near the Afghan border in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan.

To U.S.-diplomats’ surprise, the momentum built by the prisoner exchange would disappear only two years later. In 2016, the U.S. killed Mansour — then the Taliban’s leader — in an airstrike, eliminating an insurgent whom some had considered the U.S.’s best chance of getting the Taliban to the negotiating table. The move angered even some of Obama’s own aides, who anticipated that it would backfire and hinder peace talks (Greg Jaffe and Missy Ryan, “A Dubai Shopping Trip and a Missed Chance to Capture the Head of the Taliban“, The Washington Post, March 24, 2018). For their part, the Haqqanis were also simmering over the 2014 arrest of Anas Haqqani, the brother and son of the faction’s top two leaders, while he was traveling to the Gulf (Declan Walsh, “Two Haqqani Militant Leaders Are Captured, Afghan Officials Say“, The New York Times, October 18, 2014). Several months after Mansour’s death, the Taliban threatened reprisals against the Afghan government if it moved to execute Anas (Bill Roggio, “‘Blood Will Be Spilled’ If Anas Haqqani Is Executed, Taliban Threatens“, The Long War Journal, September 6, 2016). According to U.S.-journalist Jere Van Dyke, himself a former Taliban hostage, the Haqqanis had thought that the U.S. agreed to allow Haqqani operatives to travel to the Middle East after Bergdahl’s release. The U.S. detention of Anas surprised them (Jere van Dyk, “The Trade: My Journey into the Labyrinth of Political Kidnapping“, PublicAffairs, 2017, p. 318). The Taliban and the U.S. no longer seemed on the same page, nor did the War in Afghanistan appear any closer to ending in 2016 than it did in 2001. Only after the election of U.S. President Donald Trump did the Taliban signal that it might participate in peace talks after all.

While nothing suggests that the developments relate to Trump himself, his tenure has seen progress in the peace process between the Taliban and the U.S. In a February 2018 letter to “the American people”, the insurgents expressed openness to a political settlement to the War in Afghanistan (Harriet Alexander, “Taliban Publishes Open Letter to Americans“, The Telegraph, February 14, 2018). In response, former Senior Advisor to the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Barnett Rubin wrote in his own open letter to the Taliban that, while previous negotiations had failed, this opportunity seemed more promising (Barnett Rubin, “An Open Letter to the Taliban“, The New Yorker, February 27, 2018). It had emerged a month earlier that officials from the Afghan government had held preliminary conversations on peace talks with representatives of the Haqqanis in Turkey, an encouraging sign (“Afghan Peace Talks in Turkey: Haqqani Network Present but Afghan Taliban Main Faction Absent in Talks“, The Times of Islamabad, January 14, 2018). In March 2018, the U.S. indicated its willingness to support peace talks with not only the Taliban but also the Haqqanis, whom, unlike the Taliban, it had labeled a terrorist organization (Carlo Muñoz, “White House Backs Proposed Afghan-Led Peace Talks with Haqqani Network“, The Washington Examiner, March 25, 2018). In July 2017, U.S.-officials signaled that they would pursue direct peace talks with the insurgents (Mujib Mashal and Eric Schmitt, “White House Orders Direct Talks to Jump-Start Afghan Negotiations“, The New York Times, July 15, 2018). The coming months will determine whether these contacts bear fruit or meet the same result encountered by previous Afghan and U.S. attempts at negotiations, but these developments give renewed life to the push for a political settlement to the War in Afghanistan.

The Taliban attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul on January 20, 2018, left at least 40 people dead.

The Taliban attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul on January 20, 2018, left at least 40 people dead.

The questions of how the U.S. should approach peace talks or whether it should even entertain the possibility have inspired diverse suggestions. A report by the RAND Corporation proposed organizing a ceasefire in conjunction with offering Taliban leaders amnesty and power-sharing. Diplomats Lakhdar Brahimi and Thomas R. Pickering, meanwhile, emphasized the importance of maintaining a military stalemate (Lakhdar Brahimi and Thomas R. Pickering, “Afghanistan: Negotiating Peace“, Century Foundation Press, 2011, p. 2). Others have proved less optimistic. Jack Fairweather, a fellow at the Center for Middle East Studies at Harvard University, argued that the U.S. would need to address Afghanistan’s history of ethnic conflict if it wanted a true end to the war (Jack Fairweather, “The Good War: Why We Couldn’t Win the War or the Peace in Afghanistan“, Basic Books, 2014, p, 328). David Cortright, Director of Policy Studies at the Kroc Institute of Peace Studies, advocated for an immediate U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, calling the war “unwinnable” (David Cortright, “Ending Obama’s War: Responsible Military Withdrawal from Afghanistan“, Paradigm Publishers, 2011, p. 35). Thomas Ruttig, who directs the Afghanistan Analysts Network, noted that the Taliban believes in its ability to outlast the U.S. in the conflict, an expectation that the U.S. has reaffirmed by wavering on whether and how long it will stay in Afghanistan (Ruttig, p. 454). In the face of these disagreements, the possibility of a political settlement to the conflict or even an U.S. withdrawal will require deep introspection from the U.S., which has spent seventeen years fighting an enemy that remains a powerful foe on the battlefield.

While the War in Afghanistan has convinced the U.S. that only a political settlement can bring the conflict to an end, no one knows for sure whether the Taliban has reached the same conclusion. The insurgents have economic, ideological, and political incentives to continue the war. The chaos within their leadership, meanwhile, would present many challenges before and during peace talks. The insurgents’ ideology emphasizes hostility to the U.S.; their support from Iran, Pakistan, and Russia ensures that they can fight Afghan- and U.S.-soldiers for as long as they need to; the illegal drug trade remains as lucrative as ever; and the Haqqanis, with whom the U.S. has experience negotiating but who rarely make concessions, now hold primary sway over the Quetta Shura while other insurgents have started to chart their own path. These obstacles, some recent but others decades in the making, will keep the insurgents from the negotiating table until the U.S. determines how to overcome or at least accommodate them. While U.S.-diplomats, generals, and politicians have spoken of negotiations’ importance, policymakers have spent far less time assessing their own ability to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table, a task at which none have succeeded for long. Nothing guarantees that what the U.S. does can change the Taliban’s calculus. However, U.S.-policymakers can dedicate more resources to mitigating the obstacles to peace talks noted here and fewer to a war that, as many have argued, may never reach a conclusion on the battlefield.

General John W. Nicholson, center, with Afghan officials in Farah Province in May, 2018. As commander of United States and NATO forces in Afghanistan, he was instrumental in initiating a rare cease-fire in June 2018.

General John W. Nicholson, center, with Afghan officials in Farah Province in May, 2018. As commander of United States and NATO forces in Afghanistan, he was instrumental in initiating a rare cease-fire in June 2018.

The anti-Americanism inherent to the Taliban’s ideology represents the problem that dealmakers will find the hardest to assuage in the short term but the easiest to overcome in the long term. Numerous insurgencies have negotiated with opponents whom they once described as existential enemies, and the Taliban’s anti-Americanism seems to derive less from the U.S. itself than from the U.S. presence in Afghanistan, which would likely decrease or disappear after a peace treaty. In the meantime, the U.S. could offer to withdraw from Afghanistan if the Taliban agrees to a ceasefire — as well as to participate in negotiations. Despite this proposal’s apparent risks, the U.S. has the ability to deploy forces to Afghanistan at a moment’s notice. The U.S. could continue to protect Afghanistan without U.S.-soldiers there, and this superficial withdrawal would go a long way toward building goodwill with the Taliban. Refraining from calling Taliban leaders “terrorists” and removing sanctions on them could also contribute to a reduction in tensions between the insurgents and their U.S. counterparts.

Dealing with the list of regional and world powers backing the Taliban has a more obvious solution. The U.S. should make a greater effort to ensure that the peace process includes not only Pakistan but also China, Iran, and Russia, which have their own national interests in Afghanistan as well as varying degrees of sway over the Taliban. While the insurgents’ alliances with several countries have saved them from dependence on any one, the U.S. could turn the tables by getting all the Taliban’s sponsors to pressure the insurgents to participate in negotiations at once. How or even whether the U.S. could achieve such a feat remains a mystery to even the best diplomats at the State Department, but the U.S.’s current hostility toward China, Iran, Pakistan, and Russia is doing nothing to support the prospects for peace. Engaging with these countries can only help the U.S. bring the Taliban to the negotiating table.

The Taliban’s participation in the illegal drug trade offers a more complex diplomatic issue. On the one hand, international law prohibits narcotrafficking, and the spread of opium’s derivatives has ruined countless lives in Afghanistan and the rest of the world. On the other, the extent to which the illegal drug trade has become intertwined with the Taliban and the Afghan economy likely precludes enforcing a ban on the production of opium — as the insurgents themselves did almost twenty years ago. The most practical solution also seems the least palatable: turning a blind eye to the Taliban’s current and future participation in the illegal drug trade in the name of bringing peace to Afghanistan. To an extent, the U.S. has already adopted this strategy with regard to officials in the Afghan government, many of whom participate in narcotrafficking. Whether and how much the illegal drug trade will factor into peace talks falls to the U.S., which spearheads not only the War on Terror but also the War on Drugs. Maybe narcotrafficking will stop mattering to the insurgents if they no longer need to fund their war against the U.S., but the U.S. should refrain from making that assumption.

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo met with Afghan President Ashraf Ghani during a visit to Kabul in early July 2018.

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo met with Afghan President Ashraf Ghani during a visit to Kabul in early July 2018.

The decentralization of the Taliban could cause the most harm to peace talks, for the Quetta Shura may lack the authority to enforce any peace treaty to which the Taliban agrees. This problem requires a more targeted approach, forcing the U.S. to conduct outreach to several factions of the Taliban as the U.S. devises a political settlement that satisfies most or all of them. Though some pundits have proposed that the U.S. negotiate with moderate Taliban factions but fight radical ones, such a strategy sounds more divisive than productive, having the potential to divide and prolong the insurgency. Instead, the U.S. should adopt an approach that appeals to a spectrum of insurgents, from the Haqqanis to Taliban defectors with their own objectives. While never a monolithic insurgency, the Taliban today seems far more diverse than the self-described resistance movement founded twenty-four years ago.

As the U.S. ponders these obstacles to peace talks and their potential solutions, it should reflect on what it hopes to achieve in Afghanistan and whether a political settlement can produce that result. Seventeen years after the U.S. invaded the country, its goals for Afghanistan remain far from clear. The U.S. has long insisted that Afghans — the Afghan government and the Taliban — must conduct peace talks with the U.S. as a guarantor, but the continued dependence of the Afghan Armed Forces on U.S.-military aid belies this argument. Trump must decide whether to take the Taliban at its word. Assuming that he, like the the international community, judges that only negotiations can end the War in Afghanistan, the U.S. still has a long way to go before it can conduct peace talks with its oldest opponent on the battlefield.

Today, the Taliban represents a challenge far different from the insurgents whom the U.S. confronted and defeated in 2001. They no longer fear the U.S. as they did in the 1990s, nor does the Taliban show the same wariness that the U.S. does. To conduct peace talks with the insurgents and reach a political settlement to the War in Afghanistan, U.S.-policymakers must understand their enemy as well as the Taliban has come to know the U.S.

Posted in Afghanistan, Austin Michael Bodetti, English, Security Policy | Tagged , , , , | Leave a comment

Is the Russian T-90 a better tank for Iraq than the American Abrams?

by Paul Iddon.

Iraq has recently began taking delivery of 73 Russian T-90S/SK main battle tanks (MBTs), the most sophisticated tank to enter the Iraqi arsenal since the United States supplied Baghdad with 140 refurbished M1A1M Abrams MBTs (without depleted uranium layers in armor) a decade ago. To date, Iraq has received 39 T-90S tanks, all of which are now in the army’s 35th Brigade.

A flag of the Iranian-backed Hashd al-Shaabi covers parts of a US-made Abrams tank provided to the Iraqi army.

A flag of the Iranian-backed Hashd al-Shaabi covers parts of a US-made Abrams tank provided to the Iraqi army.

The delivery began amid a dispute between the Abrams’ manufacturer General Dynamics and the Iraqi Government. Late last year it was revealed at least nine Abrams tanks were being used by the country’s Shiite-majority Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) paramilitary in Iraq in violation of the terms under which the tanks were supplied to Iraq (Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations, “Operation Inherent Resolve Operation Pacific Eagle–Philippines“, Report to the United States Congress, 31.12.2017, p. 51). An Abrams tank in the PMFs possession was also involved in a clash with the Kurdish Peshmerga last October and subsequently destroyed by an anti-tank missile. General Dynamics has threatened to withhold its services until the Iraqi Government recovered the tanks, which it since has, briefly demonstrating how dependent Iraq is on the US for spare parts and maintenance for its M1 fleet.

M1A1M Abrams vs T-90S/SK: Which is the better tank?
Russian government-controlled news agency Sputnik recently argued that the Iraqi Army’s 9th Division’s 35th Brigade replaced its M1A1Ms with T-90S/SK not just because of the unreliability of maintaining the Abrams compared to the T-90S/SK but overall because the T-90S/SK is a better tank and much better suited to Iraq’s needs. While the latter is likely true in many respects analysts consulted by offiziere.ch argue that the M1A1M Abrams remains in a different league than the T-90S/SK and is a superior tank in many ways.

“In general, I think the T-90A or T-90S model tank would be badly outgunned by the M1 in a head to head fight,” Sébastien Roblin, a freelance journalist who specializes in international affairs and military history, told offiziere.ch. “Russia has built better versions (T-90AM, and T-90MS), and is developing a much improved T-90M model. Generally the M1 has way better optics and thermal imagers than the T-90, and historically the side which spots, shoots and hits first wins in tank battles,” he elaborated. “The M1’s human loader is also qualitatively better than autoloaders, and its ammunition is stowed much more safely in separate compartments, rather than a carousel in the center of the tank – in which crew members are literally surrounded by shells!”

The video above shows dock workers loading the first batch of T-90S’ for Iraq onto a ship in February 2018.

Joseph Trevithick, a writer on military-related matters for The War Zone, argued that “whatever the Russians might say” their “46-ton T-90 is simply not in the same class as the 70-ton M1. They never really intended it to be either. Different design philosophies influenced by different doctrines. The Russians are still building ‘command tank’ sub-variants with more radios and navigation aids than they’re willing to give the average conscript tank crew that ‘tethers’ even small units together in a way that has gone in many ways unchanged since World War II.”

Roblin also noted that one selling point the “Russians often talk up” about is the fact that the T-90 can engage enemy targets from a longer range than the M1 since its cannon can fire guided anti-tank missiles, something the M1 is incapable of doing. “While a cannon is generally a better anti-tank weapon — since it has a faster rate of fire and it is generally harder to defend against kinetic shells — the missiles are potentially useful for very, very long range shots and also hitting helicopters,” he went on to note. “However, I cannot think of a single account of a main battle tank firing a missile in combat –- which doesn’t mean it hasn’t ever happened, but if so, only very rarely -– so I think the ability is pretty niche if nobody is actually using it in the conflicts that have occurred so far.”

Which tank is better suited to Iraq’s needs?
Of course none of this necessarily means that the T-90S/SK is not overall better suited for Iraq’s requirements. Trevithick reckons the Russians are “not necessarily wrong” when they argue that the T-90S/SK may “be better suited to the Iraqi Army’s own capacity to operate and maintain equipment. At the same time, their ability to do things on their own is a much more pressing issue if they lost access or were having a harder time getting US-funded or facilitated contractor assistance,” he elaborated. “If the Iraqis were to completely break with the United States for whatever reason, their M1s would become unsupportable very quickly.”

Timur Akhmetov, a Middle East analyst at the Russian International Affairs Council think tank, told offiziere.ch that the T-90’s “show good performance in Iraqi conditions” since its “easy to change spare parts” and the tanks engine parts are less sensitive to dust and other grit common across Iraq’s harsh landscape. T-90s are also good for the conflicts the Iraqi army fights in since it has good protections against old and modern ATMs [anti-tank missiles] and can fire missiles through its standard tank barrel, which is perfect for desert skirmishes where the tank has to be far away from its targets,” he added, referring to the capability Roblin mentioned. Another crucial point is that T-90s are cheap if bought in large quantities,” he added. “Russia is ready to provide further services, help improving active and passive protection systems, and provide other kinds of weapons that can work together with T-90, like BMPTs Terminator.”

Tank and maintenance crews with 1st Battalion, 66th Armor Regiment, 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, install M1A2SepV2 Abrams reactive armor tiles (ARAT) at the 7th Army Training Command's Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany, Feb. 28, 2017. The installation of the ARAT will enhance the tank's defensive capabilities, providing a greater deterrent against aggression as the 3rd ABCT maintains a persistent presence in central and eastern Europe as the rotational ABCT for Atlantic Resolve. The Irak M1A1Ms do not seem to have any active protection systems by default. (Photo: Ch. (Capt.) Malcolm Rios).

Tank and maintenance crews with 1st Battalion, 66th Armor Regiment, 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, install M1A2SepV2 Abrams reactive armor tiles (ARAT) at the 7th Army Training Command’s Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany, Feb. 28, 2017. The installation of the ARAT will enhance the tank’s defensive capabilities, providing a greater deterrent against aggression as the 3rd ABCT maintains a persistent presence in central and eastern Europe as the rotational ABCT for Atlantic Resolve. The Iraqi M1A1s do not seem to have any active protection systems by default. (Photo: Ch. (Capt.) Malcolm Rios).

One other factor important to evaluate is the difference between the versions of the M1 and T-90s serving in the US and Russian armies compared to the export variants – since exported military hardware and equipment often have less capabilities than the ones supplied to the militaries of their respective countries of origin. Trevithick says “information is limited” when it comes to the precise capabilities of Iraq’s M1s and T-90s. What is for sure is that the T-90s “definitely don’t have the Shtora passive active protection systems and do not appear to have a hard-kill active protection system either.” They do, on the other hand, “appear to have the side skirts and rear slat armor associated with Russia’s own T-90MS, as well as extensive ERA [explosive reactive armor] suite. So its hard to tell exactly how this configuration stacks up even against other T-90s.” He went on to point out that the US Army’s own M1s “don’t yet have hard kill active protection systems either and it’s hard to see how Iraq’s Abrams would have a more limited passive armor package than at least the base variants, which is more robust than that on the T-90. Iraqi Abrams of course don’t have the depleted uranium armor package,” he concluded. “It is almost certain that they have less capable sensors and network connectivity than their American counterparts.”

Roblin also points out that while the M1 would likely prove a much more advantageous tank on a battlefield against enemy armor that isn’t necessarily Iraq’s priority. In the post-2003 era Iraq’s major fights have been with non-state actors which have had a limited capability to capture and field modern armor (the best the likes of Islamic State have usually managed to deploy on the battlefield have been some antiquated T-55 and T-62s). This coupled with the fact Iraq historically has more familiarity and experience working with Russian tech, which is invariably cheaper to purchase and easier to maintain, makes the T-90 a logical choice. He also pointed out that the T-90s “potentially better defenses against missiles and RPGs, thanks to its reactive armor and soft-kill active protection systems” also weights into the equation. More importantly, the T-90 is cheaper, cheaper to maintain, and weighs a lot less at just under 50 tons than the M1’s 70 tons, and there are a lot of bridges that can’t take that weight,” Roblin added. “The M1 also uses a gas-guzzling turbine engine, while the T-90 uses diesel – though T-90A/T-90S model are slower. From Iraq’s perspective, the sticker price, operating costs, and political tensions are probably the biggest issue, in any event.”

Posted in Armed Forces, English, International, Iraq, Paul Iddon, Technology | Tagged , , , , , , , , | 11 Comments

A Suppressed Voice: The Continuing Conflict in West Papua

by Sandra Ivanov. Sandra Ivanov is from New Zealand with a postgraduate education in Peace and Conflict Studies. She was formerly a policy advisor in the New Zealand public service and now primarily works in the development sector. You can connect with and follow her updates on Twitter.

A Papuan woman wearing atribute the Morning Star flag as mark the 51st anniversary of West Papua on December 1, 2012 in Yogyakarta, Indonesia (Photo by Ulet Ifansasti).

A Papuan woman wearing atribute the Morning Star flag as mark the 51st anniversary of West Papua on December 1, 2012 in Yogyakarta, Indonesia (Photo by Ulet Ifansasti).

Rwanda, Bosnia, Cambodia – All of these countries have had internationally recognised events of genocide take place in their history which has, in turn, shaped the way the world deals with the horrors of mass casualties and the difficult, but vital task of post-conflict reconstruction. But genocide is not a thing of the past, it is occurring right now in the Asia-Pacific. West Papua, a region which occupies half of the island of New Guinea is under Indonesian government authority, with most of the 2 million indigenous inhabitants living in remote areas across mountainous and forested territory. The people have been subject to systematic oppression, human rights violations, degrading indigenous culture and exploitation of resources. With restricted access of foreign media into the region, it is critical that there is continual attention given to an obscured case of government abuse.

History: the confiscated freedom of a people
The on-going conflict in West Papua has many facets, however, the main reason for the violence has been the denial of the right for self-governance and autonomy. Under the conditions of colonialism, the people of West Papua have rebelled against the rule of the Dutch East Indies – since 1867, a desire for liberation was expressed, and continued prominently in 1906, 1921, 1926, and 1935. The granting of Indonesian independence in 1949 began a process of decolonisation for the Dutch in the 1950s – Indonesia wished to obtain West Papua as part of the independence deal, claiming it was part of their territory, but the Dutch refused.

Map of the Dutch East India Isles in 1818.

Map of the Dutch East India Isles in 1818.

In 1961, the Dutch prepared for the self-determination of West Papua by setting up a council of mostly indigenous Papuans to create a national anthem and a flag, in which the Morning Star flag was flown for the first time on December 1st 1961 – West Papua’s full independence was aimed to be established in 1970. But Indonesia would not stand for this. On December 19th 1961, Indonesia launched a campaign to return West Papua as part of Indonesia’s rightful territory, and violence between the Dutch Empire and the newly established nation-state ignited. The West Papuans who pursued their right to autonomy were dismissed by Indonesia as they believed the act of independence was a cover up for creating a new Dutch puppet state.

The brute military force of Indonesia attracted international attention where the Cold War superpowers poked their heads in to figure out where their strategic goals fitted into this predicament. The United States stepped in, in 1962 to broker a deal which would be called the New York Agreement – a plan to win over Indonesia and quell the lingering Soviet influence in the country. With Indonesian interests in mind, the agreement negotiations contained no indigenous representation of West Papuans. The decision was made to place West Papua under United Nations control while preparations were made to transfer ownership to Indonesia in 1963.

The New York Agreement involved holding an “Act of Free Choice“, which would give the Papuan people a chance to decide their future. However, this is now more popularly known as the “Act of No Choice”, as the representatives chosen to speak for the West Papuans were picked by Indonesian officials and were gathered under Indonesian military supervision while they made their verdict on integration into the territory. Not surprisingly, the result was unanimously in favour of integration. The West Papuans desired a referendum, a “one-person-one-vote2 system, instead, formal control was handed to Indonesia, beginning a period of military control and human rights abuses.

In a demonstration in the UK, protesters denounce alleged torture by Indonesia in West Papua in 2012.

In a demonstration in the UK, protesters denounce alleged torture by Indonesia in West Papua in 2012.

Enduring human rights abuses and claims to genocide
Once the “Act of Free Choice” concluded, the United Nations General Assembly accepted the results, and West Papua became part of Indonesia. The Under Secretary-General of the United Nations in 1969, Chakravarthi V. Narasimhan, confessed many years later that the Act “was just a whitewash. The mood at the United Nations was to get rid of this problem as quickly as possible. Nobody gave a thought to the fact that there were a million people there who had their fundamental human rights trampled. Suharto was a terrible dictator. How could anyone have seriously believed that all voters unanimously decided to join his regime? Unanimity like that is unknown in democracies” (Clinton Fernandes, “Hot Spot: Asia and Oceania (Hot Spot Histories)“, 2008), p. 106).

It is estimated that over 500,000 West Papuans have been killed through a range of policies and organised killings. Over time pro-independence organisations began to sprout all across the West Papua region – the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka; OPM) being the most prominent group. OPM, along with its non-violent actions, has also carried out attacks on military and police targets. However, in retaliation to OPM’s early actions, the Indonesian government carried out mass military operations between 1977 and 1978, claiming these operations were required to counter attacks launched by organisations such as OPM. It is reported that over 4,000 people were killed in the highland region of West Papua during this period alone.

Other acts include the use of napalm and chemical weapons against villagers in 1981, and the massacre of 32 West Papuans in Wamena in October 2000. The area of Wamena was targeted once again in 2003 when police raids resulted in killing 9 people, torturing 38, arresting 15, and leaving thousands displaced from their homes to refugee camps where at least 42 people died from hunger and exhaustion.

Benny Wenda, a West Papuan independence leader and Chairman of the United Liberation Movement for West Papua.

Benny Wenda, a West Papuan independence leader and Chairman of the United Liberation Movement for West Papua.

Even in the last few years, non-violent action has been targeted by authorities. In 2016, the Legal Aid Institute Jakarta reported that over a period of 6 months, government authorities arrested more than 2,280 Papuans for non-violent demonstrations, and in December 2016, a series of pro-independence demonstrations in many locations across the country resulted in 500 arrests and multiple charges of treason. In 2017, Freedom House reported that more than 2,000 people were arrested for participating in non-violent demonstrations supporting independence (“Indonesia“, Freedom House, 2017).

Academic analysis has demonstrated that there is evidence to claim genocide of West Papuans through the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. A paper published through the Yale Law School outlines examples of the crimes committed in West Papua, against the articles in the Genocide Convention. It concludes that acts such as torture, disappearance, rape, systematic resource exploitation, labour transmigration schemes, and forced relocation taken as a whole appear to bring about the destruction of West Papuans. These acts “individually and collectively, clearly constitute crimes against humanity under international law”. The International Lawyers for West Papua, a non-government body of legal professionals, also support the findings of intent of genocide against the people of West Papua.

In 2017, the Asian Human Rights Commission released a statement saying that violations of human rights remain unaddressed, that the Indonesian government does not have a strong policy of human rights protection in Papua, and that these frequent violations are caused by the security approach applied. In February 2018, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights visited Indonesia stating concern “about increasing reports of the excessive use of force by security forces, harassment, arbitrary arrests and detentions in Papua”.

The movement of solidarity
It was not until the end of Suharto’s rule of Indonesia in 1998 that the stories of West Papuans could be told and reported. During a period of significant democratisation of Indonesia, space was made for Papuans to express their concerns, and political movements were reinvigorated. However, over the decades different rulers of Indonesia had different stances and policies towards the freedom of exercising speech and political assembly. The ability of ordinary Papuans to voice their concerns has therefore been irregular and disconnected.

The Indonesian regime is well known for blocking international access to the West Papua region, including foreign media, international observers and United Nations experts. This makes it difficult for international watchdogs, organisations, and researchers to get objective and reliable information of what is occurring in the region. Those outside of West Papua rely on information from local interpretation and opinions of events, and due to the lack of official reporting on these events, empirical evidence and figures cannot always be collected. History and experiences of people are a valid form of evidence, but each anecdote must be read with an open-mind to understanding other viewpoints and perspectives.

There are also armed groups fighting for the independence of West Papua; for example the West Papua National Liberation Army.

There are also armed groups fighting for the independence of West Papua; for example the West Papua National Liberation Army.

But with the rise of technology and social media, West Papuans have been using creative methods to spread their messages so that the international community are aware of their situation. Their activities have mainly involved non-violent actions through flag raisings, demonstrations, and self-declared national congress meetings to form political manifestos for an independent Papua.

Using Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter, and with access to smartphones, West Papuan activists have uploaded violent acts towards people in the region, as well as showing the exploitation of natural resources such as mining and deforestation. The most common form of non-violent action has been the raising the Morning Star flag on December 1st to support an independent Papua. This action has been occurring for over thirty years, but at a cost of potentially receiving a severe 15 year prison sentence if raised within the Indonesian territory.

Movements of solidarity in West Papua – either through violent or non-violent means – are faced with extreme consequences which include beatings, torture, and unlawful killing. So far in 2018, West Papuans have been arrested for running a disaster relief donation collection, pro-independence groups have been raided with mass arrests, and individuals have been sentenced to treason for involvement in pro-independence activities. The latest changes to Indonesia’s counter-terrorism laws could also have an impact on West Papuan armed groups.

A wave of international support and current developments
Activists in countries all over the world have formed groups in support of an independent West Papua, including international coalitions such as the International Lawyers for West Papua, and the International Parliamentarians for West Papua.

In 2016, the “Westminster Declaration for an Internationally Supervised Vote in West Papua” was launched in London, and supported by the International Parliamentarians for West Papua. The declaration has five provisions, with the main aim of redressing the wrongs from the 1969 “Act of Free Choice”, and “call for an internationally supervised vote on self-determination in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolutions 1514 and 1541 (XV)“. The declaration continues to circle the globe today in the hope for further support from world leaders.

In addition to the declaration, a petition smuggled into West Papua was reportedly signed by 1.8 million Papuans in support of holding an internationally supervised vote on self-determination. In September 2017, it was presented to the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonisation and rejected because West Papua is not part of the 17 states identified as “non-self-governing territories” by the United Nations. In a statement by the chairman, the committee confirmed that it could not receive “any request or document related to the situation of West Papua, territory which is an integral part of the Republic of Indonesia”, as well as additionally stating that “Indonesia is a good friend of ours“. Whilst the legitimacy of the petition has been questioned, the increasing evidence of the ongoing abuses of West Papuans by Indonesian security forces cannot be ignored.

The Grasberg Mine, located near Puncak Jaya in West Papua, is the largest gold mine and the third largest copper mine in the world (Photo: Kadir Jaelani).

The Grasberg Mine, located near Puncak Jaya in West Papua, is the largest gold mine and the third largest copper mine in the world (Photo: Kadir Jaelani).

Investment over freedom and justice?
In a region where calls for international investigations over human rights abuses are not followed up, and with the United Nations bodies unable to act on the status of West Papuan independence, it becomes the duty of civil society, activists, journalists, non-government organisations and interest groups to continue lobbying governments and spreading the awareness about the conflict in West Papua.

Tied up in investments, governments are afraid to call out Indonesia for its abuse of West Papuans. Allies of Indonesia are benefiting from the resource rich areas in the West Papuan region where one of the largest copper and gold mines in the world is located. Digging up more than $40 billion worth of resources by U.S. mining company, Freeport-McMoran, the extraction of these resources is expected to continue satisfying investors until 2041 until the mines become of no value.

Yet even as mines are extracted, and forests are torn down, the battle of historical narratives and truths continue, and the people of West Papua have proven they will not rest until a declaration for independence becomes a reality. In the words of academic Nino Viartasiwi: “West Papua was the victim of a large political game played from the 1940s to the 1990s. In the political struggles between the world’s two political poles, the wishes of the Papuans did not matter. Nevertheless, the efforts of the Papuans to deliver their account of history in the 2000s proves that the narration of history no longer belongs solely to the powerful”.

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The Indian Ocean Base Race Continues Apace

by Paul Pryce. With degrees in political science from both sides of the pond, Paul Pryce has previously worked as Senior Research Fellow for the Atlantic Council of Canada’s Canadian Armed Forces program, as a Research Fellow for the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, and as an Associate Fellow at the Latvian Institute of International Affairs. He has also served as an infantryman in the Canadian Forces.

Indian and Chinese officials sign files as Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping look on after the two leaders held talks on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit in Qingdao on June 9, 2018.

Indian and Chinese officials sign files as Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping look on after the two leaders held talks on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit in Qingdao on June 9, 2018.

A flurry of meetings scheduled for mid-2018 have seemed to demonstrate a rapprochement between China and India, following a tense stand-off on the Doklam Plateau between troops from the two countries in late 2017. In the central Chinese city of Wuhan, China’s President Xi Jinping and India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi held an “informal summit” on 26-27 April 2018, which was intended to “reset” the bilateral relationship. In June 2018, Xi and Modi meet again on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Qingdao. Then, in July 2018, the two leaders will meet once more in Johannesburg, South Africa for the 10th BRICS summit.

However, in the maritime realm, the rivalry between China and India continues apace. As previously reported here, 2016 saw the establishment of a Chinese naval base in Djibouti, while China acquired a 99-year lease for the Sri Lankan port of Hambantota in 2017 and India riposted with its own modest base agreement in the Seychelles. Just a few months into 2018, the momentum has continued, with numerous more announcements of port agreements and base openings in the Indian Ocean region (IOR) and the Western Pacific. These developments serve to demonstrate that, though there may have been some progress made in China-India relations at the Wuhan summit, there are very real geopolitical concerns that will continue to generate tensions between the two Asian powers.

In April 2018, the Australian media was rife with reports that China is establishing a naval base in the Pacific island nation of Vanuatu, less than 2,000 kilometres from the Australian coast. Both the authorities in China and Vanuatu have denied that there are any such plans, and it has been noted that China may simply be investigating the potential to establish a facility to monitor spacecraft and facilitate lunar rocket tests. Such a facility could also be used for intelligence gathering but would certainly not serve the same function in the Western Pacific as China’s naval base in Djibouti is meant to serve in the IOR.

However, India is poised to exert greater control over the western end of the Strait of Malacca, one of the world’s most vital shipping routes and a conduit between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Near the entrance to the Strait, a series of naval and airbases in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands would allow India to severely limit China’s access to resources in the event of a large-scale military conflict. However, the Indonesian authorities announced in May 2018 their intention to grant the Indian Navy use of revamped port facilities in Sabang, an Indonesian island 710 kilometres southeast of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. India has yet to seek a presence on the eastern end of the Strait of Malacca, but access to Sabang will allow India to further assert its influence in the IOR.

This follows the announcement in February 2018 that the Indian Navy had gained access to Duqm, a strategic port on the southern coast of Oman. Ostensibly, this agreement on logistics and the use of dry dock facilities at the port is intended to allow India to play an increased role in counter-piracy efforts near the Gulf of Aden. However, it is very likely that the outreach to Oman was motivated by a desire to counter what Indian defence planners and strategists frequently refer to as China’s “string of pearls” policy, a geopolitical strategy according to which China allegedly seeks to contain India and challenge Indian dominance in the IOR through a network of naval and airbases. In this context, China leasing the port of Hambantota is a provocative move, given that it is located less than 500 kilometres from the southern coast of India, but it is not the most ideal way to contain India: with an Indian presence in Duqm in the west and Sabang in the east, India has a strong hand at both the chokepoints to the IOR.

China and India’s Maritime Footprint in the Indian Ocean (Tuneer Mukherjee, "China’s Maritime Quest in the Indian Ocean: New Delhi’s Options", The Diplomat, 24 April 2018).

China and India’s Maritime Footprint in the Indian Ocean (Tuneer Mukherjee, “China’s Maritime Quest in the Indian Ocean: New Delhi’s Options“, The Diplomat, 24 April 2018).

Regardless of whether China is pursuing an elaborate strategy of geopolitical containment or simply seeking privileged access to developing markets, Chinese officials have been just as busy as their Indian counterparts thus far this year. In May 2018, Chinese authorities reported that they had made good progress in negotiations with Tanzania regarding the latter’s proposed mega port at Bagamoyo. Expected to become one of the largest ports in Africa, access to the facilities for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) would strengthen the Chinese presence in the western IOR. However, without more detail on the Tanzanian-Chinese negotiations, it is difficult to say whether Bagamoyo will upset the balance of power in the western IOR; as much as Duqm can balance the Chinese presence in Djibouti, the Indian military presence in the Seychelles is much more limited.

Evidently, there is some disconnect between the levels of “high politics” and “low politics” in China-India relations. Even as Xi and Modi are apparently building a good rapport in their high-level discussions in Wuhan and Qingdao, the race is on among Chinese and Indian officials to gain the upper hand in the IOR. This background tension presents a risk to peace and security between the two countries; for example, territorial disputes over India’s northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims as South Tibet, could escalate into another open confrontation as both sides seek to exploit rich deposits of mineral resources there. If the rivalry between China and India is to be set aside, much more must be done at the working level — and in haste — to improve mutual trust and build confidence in areas of security cooperation.

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